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This dissertation provides a novel theory of securitization based on intermedi-
aries minimizing the moral hazard that insiders can misuse assets held on-balance
sheet. The model predicts how intermediaries finance different assets. Under deposit
funding, the moral hazard is greatest for low-risk assets that yield sizable returns
in bad states of nature; under securitization, it is greatest for high-risk assets that
require high guarantees and large reserves. Intermediaries thus securitize low-risk as-
sets. In an extension, I identify a novel channel through which government bailouts
exacerbate the moral hazard and reduce total investment irrespective of the funding
mode. This adverse effect is stronger under deposit funding, implying that inter-
mediaries finance more risky assets off-balance sheet. The dissertation discusses the
implications of different forms of guarantees. With explicit guarantees, banks se-
curitize assets with either low information-intensity or low risk. By contrast, with
implicit guarantees, banks only securitize assets with high information-intensity and
low risk.
Two extensions to the benchmark static and dynamic models are discussed.
First, an extension to the static model studies the optimality of tranching versus se-
curitization with guarantees. Tranching eliminates agency costs but worsens adverse
selection, while securitization with guarantees does the opposite. When the quality
of underlying assets in a certain security market is sufficiently heterogeneous, and
when the highest quality assets are perceived to be sufficiently safe, securitization
with guarantees dominates tranching. Second, in an extension to the dynamic set-
ting, the moral hazard of misusing assets held on-balance sheet naturally gives rise
to the moral hazard of weak ex-post monitoring in securitization. The use of guaran-
tees reduces the dependence of banks’ ex-post payoffs on monitoring efforts, thereby
weakening monitoring incentives. The incentive to monitor under securitization with
implicit guarantees is the weakest among all funding modes, as implicit guarantees
allow banks to renege on their monitoring promises without being declared bankrupt
and punished.
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Chapter 1: Institutional Background on Securitization
1.1 Introduction
Securitization is a process and technology devised by financial intermediaries to
finance assets off-balance sheet. The first step of securitization is financial interme-
diaries setting up legally segregated entities called special purpose vehicles (SPVs).
These financial intermediaries are called sponsor banks, and the SPVs most com-
monly take the legal form of a trust. Financial intermediaries then pool assets and
transfer them to their SPVs as “true sales” of assets. The claims to the cash flows
of these assets are then sold by SPVs in the form of asset-backed securities (ABS)
in the market, and the proceeds are used to finance the purchase of the assets from
the sponsors.
The principal and interest payments of ABS depend on the cash flows of the
underlying assets and the seniority of the securities. Securities with different senior-
ity are called tranches. Securities with the highest seniority, i.e. the senior tranche,
are backed by the safest component of the cash flows of the underlying pool of assets.
By contrast, securities with the lowest seniority, i.e. the junior tranche, are backed
by the most risky component of the cash flows and hence are also called the “equity
tranche.” Different tranches of securities are rated and sold in different markets.
1
Figure 1.1: Traditional On-Balance Sheet Intermediation
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Traditionally, financial intermediaries use deposits to finance assets on-balance
sheet until maturity, and this funding mode is called deposit funding or on-balance
sheet financing. With securitization, loans can be financed not on the sponsor’s
balance sheet, but on the SPV’s balance sheet, and hence securitization is commonly
referred to as off-balance sheet financing.
To better understand the structure and function of securitization, I start with
a comparison with traditional banking intermediation. Figure 1.1 is a depiction of
traditional deposit funding and the corresponding stylized balance sheet. In this
example, XY Bank is a bank entity of XY Group, which is a bank holding company
(BHC). XY Bank raises external funds by issuing credits on checking or savings
accounts to depositors. These funds are lent out to borrowers, and the loans are
financed on the balance sheet until maturity.
By the nature of the liquidity transformation function, the traditional banking
system is potentially subject to bank runs. The introduction of federal deposit
insurance in the 1930s eliminated depositors’ incentive to withdraw their funds when
2
the solvency of a bank came into question and effectively ended bank runs. However
deposit insurance creates an incentive for banks to shift risks to the public safety net.
This second incentive is corrected by regulatory capital requirements, which mandate
banks to keep sufficient amounts of capital as skin in the game. The combination of
deposit insurance and regulatory capital requirements kept the U.S. banking system
running smoothly after the Great Depression until the 2007-09 financial crisis.
The new player in the picture is the shadow banking system, a market-based
intermediation system that runs a similar business to the traditional banking sector
but is subject to much lighter regulations. The core of this system is securitization.
Funds from outside investors, e.g. mutual funds, money market mutual funds, and
pension funds, are channeled to finance various types of loans and assets, via issuing
and selling securities backed by these loans and assets.
Securitization was first engineered in the United States by the Government
National Mortgage Association (GNMA or “Ginnie Mae”) in early 1970s as an in-
novative way to finance government-guaranteed residential mortgages. In the first
three decades of its life, securitization was primarily confined to financing residential
mortgages issued by government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), e.g. the Federal Na-
tional Mortgage Association (FNMA or “Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or “Freddie Mac”). Securitizations carried out by
non-government-sponsored financial institutions are called private-label securitiza-
tions, and they only started to pick up at the turn of the century, backed by both
residential and non-residential mortgages and many other types of underlying assets.
Since mortgage securitization was the oldest type of securitization and has
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always been a very prominent part of the securitization market, these securities
merit their own name: mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Among MBS, there are
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and non-residential mortgage-backed
securities. The agencies mentioned above are only involved in RMBS, and the MBS
issued by these agencies are called agency MBS. All other MBS issued by private
financial institutions are called non-agency MBS, which include RMBS, commercial
MBS (CMBS), and home equity securitization.
Figure 1.2 shows the annual issuance of both agency and non-agency MBS and
the total. Agency MBS date back 1970, and non-agency MBS go back to the 1980s.
However, the data on non-agency MBS issuance only goes back to 1996. The data
on non-agency MBS outstanding starts from 1980, but the market was very small
until the late 1980s and early 1990s.
From the figure, the share of non-agency MBS issuance in total issuance was
around 20% until 2003. From 2003 to 2006, this number rose from slightly above
20% to almost 60%. The issuance of non-agency MBS exceeded that of agency MBS
in 2005, peaked in 2006, and then crashed in 2007. The share of non-agency MBS
issuance plummeted to less than 5% of total MBS issuance in 2008. After that, the
issuance of non-agency MBS has been very small, reaching almost zero in 2009 and
only slowly coming back. In 2015, non-agency MBS accounted for about 11% of
total MBS issuance.
Outside the MBS market, the general name ABS applies, and private-label
securitization dominates. The most prominent underlying assets of ABS include
automobile loans, credit card debts, equipment loans, and student loans.
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Figure 1.2: U.S. MBS Issuance, USD Billions
2012 1756885 1757 8.0 3.5 45.0 56.4 1813 88 30 20 2.0 22.9 25.3 188.5 88038.22 30063.17 20128.14
2013 1642665 1643 16.2 14.3 87.0 117.4 1760 88 33 19 6.8 19.2 17.9 184.4 88488.99 33255.57 18672.67
2014 1000697 1001 28.7 9.8 99.4 137.9 1139 95 52 18 17.4 21.2 14.1 225.4 94901 51960.53 17583.16
2015 1323 37.5 18.7 100.5 156.6 1479 98 24 16 18.3 23.7 13.6 193.6 97891.84 23897.14 16194.02
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Figure 1.3 shows the annual issuance of different kinds of ABS and the total
ABS issuance. The ABS market, and the data, goes back to 1985. Total issuance
peaked in 2007 and then plummeted in 2008 to one third of its peak level. How-
ever, the market rebounded rapidly after 2010, driven mostly by securitization of
automobile loans and credit card debts. In 2014, the issuance of ABS recouped over
75% of its all-time peak in 2007, despite the very stringent regulatory environment
for securitization after the crisis.
One particular kind of ABS, asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), is worth
a separate mention. ABCPs are very short-term ABS, as indicated by the term
“commercial paper” in the name. In its prime from 2006 to 2007, the average matu-
rity of outstanding ABCP was about 30 days. ABCP was very popular before the
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Figure 1.3: U.S. ABS Issuance, USD Billions
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crisis: it was the most popular money market instrument, with an outstanding value
of $1.22 trillion just before the financial crisis. As a reference, the outstanding value
of Treasury Bills was $940 billion at that time. Note that the issuance of ABCP is
not included in the ABS issuance data used to plot Figure 1.3. Because of the short
maturity, there is no consolidated database on ABCP issuance. Fortunately, the
data for ABCP outstanding can be easily found in the Federal Reserve Economic
Database. Section 1.5 will discuss the ABCP market in more detail.
When the underlying assets are whole loans or legal rights to specific assets
and cash flows, securitization is referred to as funding securitization. ABS, MBS,
and asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) are in this category. There is also
non-funding securitization, in which the underlying assets are tranches of existing
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securities or derivatives. All kinds of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) are in
this category. This dissertation only focuses on funding securitization.
Abstracting from unnecessary details, the core intermediation relationship and
the corresponding stylized balance sheet in securitization are depicted in Figure 1.4.
In this example, the bank entity is XY Bank, which in reality can be any commercial
bank or investment bank.
To securitize, the BHC (XY Group) sets up an SPV. XY Bank originates
assets, i.e. issues loans to borrowers, and transfers them to the SPV. In this example,
XY Bank sells loan portfolio 2 to its SPV. The SPV issues and sells ABS to investors
and uses the proceeds to finance their purchase of loan portfolio 2 from XY Bank.
In this case, XY Bank is called the sponsor bank, and ABS are claims to the cash
flows of the pool of loans to borrowers (loan portfolio 2). The cash flows are passive
in the sense that the underwriting decision has already been made prior to the point
of securitization, and the SPV is merely a robot entity that follows pre-specified
rules designed by their sponsors (Gorton and Metrick, 2012).
At the core, off-balance sheet financing performs the same functions as tra-
ditional banking, i.e. liquidity and maturity transformation, but under new names
and with few regulations before the crisis. By nature, shadow banking is prone to
runs if there is no insurance mechanism, and if there is public insurance, it is prone
to risk-shifting in the absence of regulatory capital requirements.
One important feature in a lot of securitizations is the provision of guarantees
by sponsors. In Figure 1.4, the sponsor bank, XY Bank, provides guarantees to its
SPV. These guarantees can be either explicit or implicit, and both types provide
7
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recourse from the SPV to the sponsor bank’s balance sheet. When the pool of loans
(loan portfolio 2) is not performing and the SPV falls short of cash flows to pay off
investors, XY Bank would have to honor these guarantees by buying back securities
from investors at par.
In the corresponding balance sheet, potential guarantee payments to outside
investors are a liability of XY Bank, and in order to stand ready for this obligation,
XY Bank has to hold assets on its balance sheet as reserves for potential guarantee
payments.
Implicit guarantees are verbal promises that sponsor banks make to buy back
maturing securities at par from outside investors. Their use is evidenced in empirical
studies on credit-card securitization. Explicit guarantees are contractual obligations
of sponsor banks to buy back maturing securities at par, and are frequently used
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in the ABCP market. Acharya et al. (2013) document the prevalent use of explicit
guarantees in the ABCP market. Section 1.5 presents more details on the ABCP
market.
This dissertation emphasizes that the shadow banking system is not completely
separated from the regulated banking system. A lot of sponsor banks are commer-
cial banks or investment banks that are regulated and are oftentimes considered
to be too-big-to-fail banks that have access to not only deposit insurance but also
government bailouts. The use of guarantees links the shadow banking system to the
regulated banking system.
Arguably, the collapse of ABS markets triggered the massive financial turmoil
starting in 2007, and the severity of the crisis lay precisely in the fact that losses on
bad assets were not all passed on to final investors (Covitz et al., 2009). Acharya et
al. (2013) document that, due to the use of explicit guarantees, only 2.5% of ABCP
outstanding as of July 2007 entered default from July 2007 to December 2008, a
phenomenon the authors refer to as “securitization without risk transfer.”
While this discussion omits significant details and heterogeneity across differ-
ent markets, it does cover the general structures and features in securitization.1
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the legal
form and characteristics of SPVs. Section 1.3 summarizes the use of credit en-
hancement in securitization. Section 1.4 provides a comprehensive overview of the
evolution of regulations and accounting standards relating to securitization. Section
1For a through exposition of various types of securitization structures and regulations, see
Adrian and Ashcraft (2012), Gorton and Metrick (2012), and Pozsar et al. (2012).
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1.5 describes the ABCP market as a leading example of securitization.
1.2 Special Purpose Vehicles
1.2.1 Legal Form of SPVs
Securitization SPVs are commonly in the legal form of a trust. According to
the pre-crisis accounting rules, trusts were considered as qualifying special purpose
entities (QSPEs), and hence transferring assets to a trust was considered a“true sale”
of assets, which is important for the purpose of keeping assets off-balance sheet. Hav-
ing witnessed the overheating of securitization markets, post-crisis accounting rules
removed the concept of QSPE and eliminated all its references regarding the qualifi-
cation of “true sale.” Section 1.4 discusses the change in the regulatory environment
in more detail.
SPVs are robot entities that have no physical location, no employees, and
typically make no investment or management decisions. They only follow a pre-
specified set of rules governing the acquisition and purchase of assets from their
sponsors or other financial intermediaries, the pooling and tranching of the acquired
pool of assets, and the issuing and selling of securities. From this perspective, once
the rules are set at the moment of creating the SPV, the sponsor bank is a passive
contributor to the SPV, and the SPV is a passive recipient of assets.
Due to the pre-specified rules, the discretion of the sponsor banks’ managers
over the transferred assets and their cash flows is significantly reduced relative to
the case in which the assets are held on-balance sheet. This is called the “surrender
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of control.”
In the very early days of securitization, a new SPV had to be set up each time
a pool of loans was securitized. Later, financial intermediaries commonly used the
legal form of a “Master Trust” for their SPVs, which allowed different vintages of
loan pools to be sold to the same trust, and securities to be issued corresponding to
each vintage (Gorton and Metrick, 2012). Master Trusts are particularly popular
in the securitization of credit card loans, given the continuing nature of consumer
credit card debts (Gorton and Metrick, 2012).
1.2.2 Bankruptcy Remote
An essential feature of SPVs is that they are “bankruptcy remote,” which
means that if the sponsor bank defaults and files bankruptcy, assets in the SPV
are safe from being consolidated back onto the sponsor’s balance sheet and being
liquidated to pay the sponsor bank’s creditors.
In terms of minimizing financing costs, bankruptcy remoteness is important
not only because it is a pre-requisite for SPVs to receive off-balance sheet treatment,
but also in that it separates the credit quality of the assets being securitized from that
of the sponsor. In the cases where the sponsor bank has a lower credit rating than
the pool of mortgages being securitized, bankruptcy remoteness helps the sponsor
bank reduce financing costs, as investors can see the SPV and the sponsor as two
separate entities with different risk levels.
In the early days of securitization, there was some confusion about the neces-
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sary accounting steps needed to ensure that a certain asset had in fact been sold to
the SPV. To clarify this, Financial Accounting Standards Boards (FASB) required
a two-step approach, in which sponsor banks set up two trusts, one for purchasing
assets and one for issuing securities. Any residual interest that the sponsor holds
in the SPV assets is held by the purchasing SPV, instead of the sponsor. Under
this two-tiered structure, the transfer of assets constitutes a “true sale,” which is
the prerequisite for bankruptcy remoteness (Gorton and Souleles, 2007). Case law
has to date upheld the bankruptcy remoteness of securitization SPVs (Gorton and
Metrick, 2012).
When guarantees are used, they have to be structured in a certain way, such
that, combined with this two-tiered structure, asset transfers are still considered
“true sales.”
1.3 Credit Enhancement and Guarantees
In securitization, credit enhancement takes a variety of forms, with the two
most important being tranching and private guarantees.
In most securitizations, SPVs issue tranches of securities based on seniority.
There are senior tranches, junior tranches, and intermediate mezzanine tranches,
which are all horizontal slices of the underlying pool of assets. Under this tiered
structure, the mezzanine and the junior tranches are subordinates of the senior
tranche, meaning that the cash flows from the underlying pool of assets must be
first allocated to make principal and interest payments of the senior tranche.
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Private guarantees in the form of lines of credit and outright guarantees are
frequently used in securitization to enhance the quality, liquidity, and eventually the
rating of securities.2
As discussed before, securitization uses both explicit and implicit guarantees.
The nature of these guarantees is that when the underlying pool does not generate
enough cash flow to pay off security holders, the sponsor bank is obligated to pay
off investors at par. However, to comply with being a “true sale,” sponsor banks
often use implicit guarantees. In the case where explicit guarantees are provided,
they are most frequently structured as liquidity guarantees, rather than outright
credit guarantees. The main difference between a liquidity guarantee and a credit
guarantee is that in the former case the sponsor bank only needs to make payments
to ABS holders when the underlying asset is claimed as solvent. Supposedly, a
liquidity guarantee is a contingent provision of liquidity and not a full exposure
to the credit risk of the underlying assets. Therefore, according to the pre-crisis
accounting rules, using a liquidity guarantee did not invalidate a “true sale,” and the
underlying assets were still considered off-balance sheet and were subject to much
lower capital requirements. Section 1.5.3 discusses the differences between various
types of guarantees in more detail.
2A line of credit is an arrangement between a financial institution and a customer, in the case
of securitization the sponsor bank and the SPV, that establishes a maximum loan balance that the
sponsor bank will permit the SPV to maintain.
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1.4 Regulatory Environment
One important motive for securitization before the financial crisis was to re-
duce cost of financing and evade capital requirements by moving assets off-balance
sheet, i.e. regulatory arbitrage. To understand and assess this motive, two points are
important regarding the regulatory environment pertaining to securitization: first,
the rules governing recognition of assets as truly off-balance sheet, i.e. exemption
from consolidation, and second, the treatment of capital requirements for the iden-
tified off-balance sheet assets. This section describes these two points and highlights
changes in the regulatory environment over time.
1.4.1 Off-Balance Sheet Recognition
For an asset to be considered off balance sheet, the transfer from the sponsor
to the SPV has to satisfy certain criteria set forth by the Financial Accounting
Standards Boards (FASB) in the United States, and the International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS) in more than 110 other countries.
The requirements in IFRS regarding consolidation have traditionally been
stringent and robust and have withstood the financial crisis. As a result, there
have not been any significant changes over time to IFRS rules. By contrast, the
FASB issued two statements, Statements 166 and 167, in June 2009. These two
statements, together with an additional rule published on January 2010 by Federal
banking agencies drastically changed the standards for accounting consolidation in
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the U.S.3 This section focuses on the evolution of standards for accounting consoli-
dation in the U.S. that are relevant to securitization.
In the U.S., the FASB publishes and updates Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (US GAAP) that govern the standards and procedures that U.S. com-
panies use to compile financial statements. Historically, there are various relevant
accounting standards under US GAAP, some current and some obsolete, that de-
termine whether an SPV shall be consolidated. The treatments for guarantees have
also changed drastically over time. These rules are extraordinarily complex, and
for clarification and better implementation, the FASB publishes interpretations to
guide accounting professionals (Counter-party Risk Management Policy Group III
[CRMP III], 2008).
Consolidation is defined as the process by which the financial statement of a
parent is combined with those of its subsidiaries, as if they were a single economic
entity (CRMP III, 2008). Consolidated financial statements are considered more
useful for investors and creditors. Assets on a consolidated SPV are considered
on-balance sheet and are subject to more stringent capital requirements.
SPVs can be structured as three types of entities, and there are three consoli-
dation models, each based on the type of entity an SPV is structured as. The three
types of entities are: (1) voting entities, (2) variable interest entities (VIEs), and
(3) qualifying special purposes entities (QSPEs).
The consolidation rule for voting entities was codified in Accounting Research
3This rule was jointly issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Office of Thrift
Supervision.
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Bulletin No. 51 (ARB 51), Consolidated Financial Statements, issued in August
1959. It requires an enterprise to consolidate an entity, e.g. an SPV, if the enterprise
unilaterally controls the entity through majority voting interests.
In September 2000, the FASB created the concept of QSPE in Financial Ac-
counting Standard No. 140 (FAS 140). FAS 140 specifies that, if an off-balance sheet
entity can be deemed as a QSPE and the sponsor surrenders control, the entity can
be exempted from consolidation and receive off-balance sheet treatment.
Under FAS 140, an SPV is a QSPE if it is (1) “demonstrably distinct” from the
sponsor, (2) it is an automaton in the sense that there are no substantive decisions
for it to make, and rules specified by the legal documents defining its existence
must be strictly followed. The term “demonstrably distinct” means that at least
10% of the value of the SPV is held by unrelated third parties, and the sponsor
cannot dissolve the SPV and liquidate the transferred assets unilaterally, i.e. the
SPV must be bankruptcy remote (Gorton and Metrick, 2012). The term “surrender
control” means that the sponsor cannot retain effective control of the transferred
assets through an ability to dictate the use of the transferred assets or unilaterally
ask the SPV to return assets.
To sum up, to be considered as off-balance sheet under the QSPE framework,
the SPV must be a separate and distinct legal entity, with no substantial decisions
to make, and must be bankruptcy remote. These criteria were easily met by the two-
tiered structure mentioned above. As a result, securitization vehicles that held credit
card receivables, automobile loans, residential mortgages, and commercial mortgages
were commonly structured as QSPEs to receive off-balance sheet treatment.
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Both the ARB 51 and the FAS 140 framework emphasize the legal form of
the relationship between a sponsor and an entity and not the substance of the
underlying transactions, and the former can be more easily manipulated (Gilliam,
2005). An infamous example of such accounting manipulation is the downfall of
Enron in 2001, brought about in part by its use of off-balance sheet entities to
deliberately understate its liabilities and overstate its profits. What Enron did was
to set up entities in which it had no voting rights, while absorbing the entity’s entire
risks and rewards.
In response to the Enron scandal, the FASB issued an official interpretation,
FASB Interpretation No. 46 (FIN 46) of ARB 51, in January 2003, and a revision of
it, FIN 46R, in December 2003. FIN 46 and 46R introduced the concept of Variable
Interest Entities (VIEs) and laid out a consolidation framework based on financial
interest, determined by the benefits received or risk taken, rather than voting rights.
Under FIN 46R, an off-balance sheet entity should be consolidated if the spon-
sor bank has financial interest and voting rights. If not, the off-balance sheet entity is
a VIE. In this case, the accountant looks to each stakeholder to determine who holds
the majority of the entity’s risks or rewards (or both), i.e. the primary beneficiary.
The primary beneficiary must consolidate the VIE.
All types of guarantees, explicit and implicit, were considered a variable inter-
est under FIN 46R, and hence many sponsor banks of SPVs and ABCP conduits met
the primary beneficiary test and were required to consolidate (Deloitte & Touche
LLP, 2007). However, if an SPV was deemed as a QSPE, the VIE rule did not apply.
In the year of 2003 to 2004, the growth of the ABCP market came to a com-
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plete halt, due to the uncertainty of the implementation of FIN 46R. In July 2004,
Federal banking regulators issued a new rule for computing capital requirements of
ABCP programs.4 Under the new rule, ABCP programs consolidated under FIN
46R were excluded from capital ratio calculations, but guarantees had to be tested
to determine their quality and were included in capital calculations. In particular,
credit guarantees were treated as equivalent to on-balance sheet financing, and thus
had a conversion factor of 100%. Long-term liquidity guarantees (greater than one
year) were assigned a 50% conversion factor, and short-term liquidity guarantees, the
most commonly used type, were assigned a 10% conversion factor (Gilliam, 2005).
Therefore, from 2004 to 2009, securitization SPVs were most commonly struc-
tured as QSPEs or ABCP conduits, both of which received off-balance sheet treat-
ments with lower capital requirements, either under FAS 140 or the new rule for
computing capital requirements even if the VIE rule applied.
After witnessing the financial turmoil in 2007-09, in June 2009, the FASB
issued Statement No. 166, Accounting for Transfers of Financial Assets (FAS 166),
and Statement No. 167, Amendments to FASB Interpretation No. 46(R) (FAS
167). FAS 166 revised FAS 140, by, among other things, eliminating the concept of
QSPEs. Thus, the option to structure an SPV as a QSPE and not consolidate was
no longer available. FAS 167 revised FIN 46R by changing the VIE rule. Under FAS
167, if a bank has the power to direct significant activities of the VIE, and has the
obligation to absorb losses or the right to receive benefits that can be potentially
4This rule was jointly issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Office of Thrift
Supervision.
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significant to the VIE, then the bank is deemed the primary beneficiary of, and
hence must consolidate, the VIE. FAS 167 also requires auditors to conduct ongoing
assessments of all financial linkages, including both implicit and explicit guarantees.
Under this new rule, if a bank provides any guarantees to its SPV, the bank must
consolidate the SPV.
In January 2010, Federal banking agencies published in the Federal Register a
final rule amending their capital calculation guideline issued in 2004 (FAS 166/167
Rule).5 This rule revoked the exemption previously granted to ABCP programs
under the July 2004 rule. The reporting guidance for the transition to the capital
requirements associated with FAS 166 and FAS 167 can be found in Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) (2010).
In this new regulatory environment, even though most SPVs continue to be
bankruptcy remote, most of the transferred assets have been consolidated back onto
the balance sheets of sponsors for financial reporting purposes.
1.4.2 Capital Requirements
Capital requirements for off-balance sheet items have also experienced drastic
changes in the U.S.
Before the post-crisis regulatory reform, depending on the type of guarantees
involved, qualifying off-balance sheet assets were mostly subject to much lower cap-
ital requirements than comparable on-balance sheet assets. According to Basel I,
5This rule was published jointly by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Office of
Thrift Supervision.
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which was issued in 1988 and adopted by U.S. banks before the crisis, the risk weight
was 50% for residential mortgages and 100% for private sector debt if held on-balance
sheet. By contrast, the risk weight for securitized assets with no guarantees was 0%,
while for securitized assets with liquidity guarantees, the risk weight was only 10%
of what was required correspondingly if the assets were held on-balance sheet. Se-
curitized assets with credit guarantees were treated equivalently to on-balance sheet
assets. In addition to Basel capital requirements, U.S. banks also had to satisfy a
leverage test, which also exempted securitized assets if they were qualified under US
GAAP (Acharya et al. 2013).
U.S. banks started shifting from Basel I to Basel II, issued in 2004, in early
2008. Basel II assigns risk weights according to security ratings, with highly rated
securities assigned lower risk weights. In Basel II, under the standardized approach,
the capital requirements for securitized assets covered by liquidity guarantees in-
creased from 10% to 20% relative to on-balance sheet financing. After the financial
crisis, the Basel guidelines were superseded in the U.S. by the Federal FAS 166/167
Rule that requires banks to hold capital equivalent to on-balance sheet financing for
conduit assets under liquidity guarantees.
1.4.3 Additional Regulatory Measures
To address the lack of appropriate due diligence on securitized assets prior to
the crisis, the Basel framework now also requires banks to meet specific operational
criteria in order to use the risk weights specified in Basel II. Failure to meet these
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criteria will result in assets being risk weighted at 1250%, which is equivalent to a
deduction from the sponsor’s capital.
Similar measures have also been taken by U.S. authorities. The Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act) of 2010
requires sponsor banks to retain at least 5% of the credit risk of any asset being
securitized.
Overall, the post-crisis regulatory environment for securitization is much more
stringent than before the financial crisis.
Interestingly, the ABS market shrank significantly during the financial crisis
but rebounded rapidly after 2010, despite the stringent new regulatory environment.
The issuance of non-agency MBS has been steadily increasing since 2010, while the
issuance of ABS has recouped 3/4 of its 2007 peak. In 2014, new issuance of ABS
were at double their 2010 low, and the issuance of CMBS was up from just $5 billion
in 2009 to more than $100 billion in 2015. Even in the ABCP market, where the
regulatory arbitrage view drew evidence from, the outstanding value has stabilized
at around $250 billion. Given that the average maturity of ABCP is around 30
days, this market rolls over $250 billion worth of debts on a monthly basis, which is
hardly a small or inactive market. The rebound of securitization activities despite
the strict post-crisis regulations suggests that regulatory arbitrage was not the sole
explanation of securitization prior to 2008.
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1.5 An Example: Asset-Backed Commercial Paper
An interesting example of securitization is asset-backed commercial paper
(ABCP). ABCP is most commonly purchased by outside investors, with the ma-
jority of holders being money market mutual funds and pension funds. Thus, the
ABCP market provides linkages between outside investors and the financial sector
(Acharya et al., 2013). The majority of the underlying assets of ABCP are ABS and
RMBS (Acharya et al., 2013). To some extent, one can think of ABS and MBS as
analogous to intermediate goods, with ABCP being the final good sold to outside
investors.
Acharya et al. (2013) document that there is practically no risk transfer be-
tween banks and outside investors in this market. This result contradicts the tra-
ditional understanding that banks securitize to transfer risks. In reality, risks are
only transferred between banks, and when it comes the banking system as a whole
versus outside investors, there is no substantial transfer of risk. From July 2007 to
December 2008, only 2.5% of outstanding ABCPs entered default (Acharya et al.,
2013). This section presents a detailed overview of the ABCP market.
In the ABCP market, SPVs are called ABCP conduits (or simply conduits).
ABCP conduits are a form of SPV set up by banks to finance medium- to long-
term assets with short-term liabilities in an off-balance sheet fashion. Before the
financial crisis, more than half of ABCP daily issuances had maturities of 1 to 4
days, referred to as “overnight,” and the average maturity of outstanding paper was
about 30 days.
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As in any securitization, sponsor banks originate or acquire assets and transfer
them to their conduits. Conduits issue ABCPs and sells them to outside investors.
To secure high ratings, sponsor banks frequently provide guarantees to their con-
duits.
While the vast majority of conduits have credit ratings from major rating
agencies, the specific assets held in the programs are not widely known. Some
ABCP programs view their holdings to be proprietary investment strategies and
deliberately do not disclose.
1.5.1 The History of ABCP
ABCP first appeared in the mid-1980s. Initially, ABCP conduits were primar-
ily sponsored by major commercial banks to provide receivable financing to their
corporate customers. In the past two decades, ABCP conduits have grown to serve
a much wider range of purposes, such as asset-based financing for companies that
cannot access the commercial paper market, warehousing assets prior to security is-
suance, providing leverage to mutual funds, and most importantly off-balance sheet
funding of bank assets (Acharya et al., 2013).
In general, any asset class that has been funded in the ABS and MBS markets
has also been funded by ABCP conduits, and there are a wide variety of assets
that are unique to the conduit market, e.g. receivables from unsettled transactions.
However, as of 2007, the majority of assets held by ABCP conduits were residential
mortgages and RMBS (Acharya et al., 2013).
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Figure 1.5: U.S. ABCP Outstanding, USD Billions
easonally Adjusted
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Figure 1.5 depicts the seasonally adjusted monthly outstanding of ABCP from
2001 to 2016.6 As of September 2001, there were approximately 280 active ABCP
programs, with more than $650 billion outstanding (Acharya et al., 2013). From
2004 to 2007, ABCP saw a steady rise in market volume, fueled by the high demand
for safe assets by institutional investors and a more relaxed regulatory environment.
In the years before the crisis, even the most conservative investors, like money
market mutual funds and retirement funds, began to purchase ABCP. The out-
standing value of ABCP reached its all-time peak of $1.22 trillion in July 2007. At
that time, ABCP was the largest money market instrument in the U.S., followed
by Treasury Bills with an outstanding value of $940 billion. This trend came to an
abrupt end in August 2007.
6Data on U.S. ABCP issuance is not available.
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Throughout 2007, negative news about U.S. residential mortgages spread, and
subprime MBS started to lose value. Investors in ABCP conduits with exposures
to subprime mortgages began to worry about the value of their paper and stopped
rolling over their positions. At first, sponsor banks were able to pay off investors us-
ing their reserves and capital. As market confidence continued to deteriorate, flocks
of investors turned their backs, and even the largest sponsor banks, e.g. Citibank
and JP Morgan, began to experience difficulties (Acharya et al., 2013).
One of the defining moments of the crisis occurred in August 2007 when the
French bank BNP Paribas suspended withdrawals from three of its funds invested
in ABCP. Although defaults on mortgages had been rising since early 2007, the
suspension triggered a panic in the ABCP market. The interest rate spread of
overnight ABCP over the Federal Funds Rate spiked from 10 basis points to 150
basis points within one day of the BNP announcement (Covitz et al., 2013).
Subsequently, the ABCP market experienced a modern-day bank run (Covitz
et al., 2013). Investors rushed out of the market, several ABCP conduits failed, and
many sponsor banks bled to the point of needing government bailouts. By the end of
December 2007, ABCP outstanding had dropped from $1.22 trillion to $774.5 billion.
The market stabilized only after the federal government stepped in by announcing
the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility
(AMLF) in September 2008, and the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF)
and the Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF) in October 2008.
In the first half of 2009, the ABCP market experienced another sharp contrac-
tion, reduing the outstanding value to around $400 billion. From January 2012 to
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March 2016, the ABCP outstanding averaged at around $250 billion. In contrast to
the quick recovery of the ABS market, ABCP outstanding only slightly rebounded
in 2015 and 2016. One of the many reasons is the change in capital requirements
for liquidity guarantees. Banks can no longer use liquidity guarantees to circumvent
capital requirements and appeal to the demand for safe assets at the same time.
Despite the slow recovery, the $250 billion market is hardly a small one, and it is
still playing an important role in the money market.
1.5.2 Sponsors of ABCP
The structure of ABCP is similar to other securitizations as presented in Sec-
tion 1.1. ABCP conduits are set up by sponsor banks that range from large com-
mercial banks to non-bank financial institutions, like mortgage lenders and asset
managers. Large U.S. banks have a history in sponsoring ABCP conduits, while
smaller U.S. banks sponsor a very modest share.
Foreign banks sponsor a substantial share of ABCP, about 40 percent in 2007.
Non-bank institutions, such as mortgage lenders, finance companies, or asset man-
agers, also sponsor a considerable share of the market. Programs sponsored by non-
bank institutions grew more dramatically than other programs and doubled their
asset holdings from 2004 to 2007 (Covitz et al., 2013). The ten largest sponsors as
of January 2007 were: Citigroup (U.S.), ABN AMRO (Netherlands), Bank of Amer-
ica (U.S.), HBOS Pls (U.K.), JP Morgan (U.S.), HSBC (U.K.), Deutsche Bank AG




Contrary to our traditional understanding of securitization, sponsor banks
effectively retain the risk of conduit assets by providing explicit guarantees. Ranked
from the strongest to the weakest, the different types of guarantees offered are: full
credit guarantee, full liquidity guarantee, extendible notes guarantee, and guarantee
arranged via structured investment vehicles (SIVs).
Full credit guarantees provide the highest insurance to outside investors but
expose sponsor banks to the same risks as holding assets on their balance sheets.
Hence from a regulatory aspect, banks providing full credit guarantees are required
to hold sufficient regulatory capital. In other words, assets covered by credit guaran-
tees do not receive off-balance sheet treatment. From 2001 to 2009, 13% of ABCPs
were covered by full credit guarantees (Acharya et al., 2013).
Full liquidity guarantees are similar to full credit guarantees with the main
difference being that the sponsor only needs to pay off maturing papers if the under-
lying assets are not in default. In principle it is possible that full liquidity guarantees
expire before the paper matures due to defaults of underlying assets. However, since
conduit assets have much longer maturities than their ABCPs, it is very unlikely to
happen that an ABCP vintage has not expired but the underlying asset is deemed
insolvent. Hence full liquidity guarantees were viewed as almost equivalent to full
credit guarantees from the ABCP investor’s perspective. According to the pre-crisis
7For more details on ABCP sponsors, see Acharya et al. (2013).
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regulation, full liquidity guarantees allowed banks to hold much less capital than
full credit guarantees, 10% to be exact. From 2001 to 2009, about 61%, of ABCPs
were covered by full liquidity guarantees (Acharya et al., 2013).
In extendible notes guarantee arrangements, banks have the discretion to ex-
tend maturing commercial papers for a limited period of time. Hence, they are
considered weaker than full liquidity guarantees. From 2001 to 2009, they covered
about 18% of outstanding ABCPs (Acharya et al., 2013).
SIV guarantees only cover a share of the conduit’s liabilities, and are considered
the weakest from investor’s point of view. 7% of ABCPs were covered by SIV
guarantees from 2001 to 2009 (Acharya et al., 2013).
Partial risk transfer as in the case of SIV guarantees conformed to the tradi-
tional view of securitization. In contrast, the majority of ABCP conduits, about
61% during the period from 2001 to 2009, were supported by full liquidity guaran-
tees that ensured the highest credit rating so that they could be easily sold to even
the most risk sensitive investors, and, at the same time, reduced regulatory capital
requirements. This risk sharing structure provided ABCP conduits a recourse back
to fully regulated financial intermediaries that were mostly large commercial banks
with access to government bailouts.
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Chapter 2: To Securitize or Not? An Agency Cost Perspective
2.1 Introduction
Securitization is a process in which financial intermediaries move assets off
their balance sheets and finance them by issuing securities backed by the assets’
cash flows, i.e. asset-backed securities (ABS). As a key step in off-balance sheet
financing, securitization is crucial for the functioning of the shadow banking system
that channels funds from investors to borrowers in an unregulated fashion.
In the years since the financial crisis, about 25% of U.S. consumer credit and
60% to 80% of mortgage credit has been financed through securitization and the
shadow banking system. The significance of securitization and shadow banking for
the well-being of the financial system was illustrated vividly and mercilessly during
the recent financial crisis. The collapse of the mortgage-backed security (MBS)
market and the sudden freeze of the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market
played a key role in triggering the financial crisis in 2007.1
Despite its importance, this system is largely unregulated. Prior to the crisis,
off-balance sheet activities were often not subject to reporting duties to banking
authorities, and off-balance sheet assets were not subject to as stringent capital
1The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, Part IV.
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requirements as on-balance sheet assets. From this perspective, the shadow banking
system is largely self-disciplined, and as a consequence, principal-agent problems are
fundamental issues in securitization.
This dissertation explores how market frictions, namely moral hazard, affect
financial intermediaries’ securitization decisions, including what to securitize, how to
securitize, and how to monitor securitized assets. Understanding these decisions is
important for forming a more comprehensive framework to think about securitization
and to guide policy making around shadow banking.
According to the traditional risk-transfer view, financial intermediaries secu-
ritize to transfer risks from their balance sheets to outside investors. However, con-
trary to this view, the shadow banking system is a major provider of safe assets to
outside investors. The empirical literature has documented that financial intermedi-
aries frequently retain the risks of securitized assets by providing guarantees to their
SPVs to secure outside investors’ returns.2 The severity of the crisis lay precisely
in the fact that losses on bad assets were not all passed on to outside investors.3
Acharya et al. (2013) interpret the existence of “securitization without risk trans-
fer” as evidence that banks securitize to get around capital requirements. However,
this regulatory-arbitrage view only applies to securitization by banks that are in-
deed subject to capital requirements.4 In fact, in the subprime MBS market, among
2Implicit guarantees are commonplace in credit card securitization (Higgins and Mason, 2004;
Gorton and Souleles, 2007). Explicit guarantees are extensively used in the asset-backed commer-
cial paper (ABCP) market (Acharya et al., 2013).
3Acharya et al. (2013) document that only 2.5% of ABCP outstanding as of July 2007 entered
default from July 2007 to December 2008, and hence term the phenomenon “securitization without
risk transfer.”
4See Gorton and Metrick (2010) for a survey on the literature of securitization, and Gorton and
Metrick (2012) for a discussion of regulating shadow banking.
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the top 10 originators (or sponsors) in 2005 and 2006, four were commercial banks
and six were non-depository specialized mono-lined mortgage lenders (Ashcraft and
Schuermann, 2008). Even in the ABCP market, as of January 2007, about 28% of
the total value of ABCPs in the market were sponsored by non-bank institutions
that were not subject to regulatory capital requirements, and therefore presumably
had no regulatory arbitrage motive (Acharya et al., 2013).
This chapter develops a novel theory of securitization based on intermediaries
minimizing moral hazard that does not suffer the shortcomings of the existing two
views. The chapter focuses on the moral hazard that insiders and managers in fi-
nancial institutions, who have discretion over how to use assets on-balance sheet,
can misuse assets for their own benefit. This moral hazard can be generally inter-
preted as insiders’ incentives to engage in ex-post activities that benefit themselves
but can hurt outside investors. For example, insiders may have an incentive ex-post
to misuse the cash flows of assets held on-balance sheet, or to take on higher risks.
Insiders benefit from such activities, but outside investors are the ones bearing losses
in bad states.
This chapter presents a benchmark static model and shows that securitization
can reduce this moral hazard by increasing the remoteness of assets from managers
in financial institutions. This idea is formulated in a banking model in which in-
termediaries choose between deposit funding and securitization in an environment
with moral hazard. Even when intermediaries provide guarantees and the result-
ing risk-sharing structures are equivalent under securitization and deposit funding,
insiders’ incentive to divert assets, i.e. the magnitude of the moral hazard, is differ-
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ent under the two funding modes. The moral-hazard-reducing motive implies that
securitization can be an appealing financial structure for low-risk assets.
The model economy consists of a bank holding company (BHC) that has a bank
entity and an SPV, and a continuum of outside investors. Two features are impor-
tant. First, the BHC is risk neutral, and outside investors are infinitely risk-averse.
This assumption makes it desirable for the BHC to use guarantees in securitization
to secure outside investors’ returns. The infinite risk-aversion assumption imposed
on outside investors greatly simplifies the analysis without losing generality, as re-
sults are robust to less-than-infinite risk-aversion. To stand ready for guarantee
payments, the BHC needs to hold safe reserves on the bank entity’s balance sheet.
Second, as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), there is a moral hazard that insiders of
the BHC can divert a portion of the assets held on the bank entity’s balance sheet
and let the BHC default. One possible interpretation of variation in the seizable
portion is that it represents variation in the assets’ information intensity. Assets
with high information-intensity, e.g. small business loans, are harder for outside
investors to value, and thus easier for insiders to divert.
Insiders’ incentives to divert assets are greatest in bad states of nature. Under
deposit funding, the BHC holds assets on the bank entity’s balance sheet, and
its incentive to divert is greatest for low-risk assets that yield sizable returns in
bad states. By contrast, under securitization, the BHC holds reserves on the bank
entity’s balance sheet, and the moral hazard is most severe for high-risk assets
that imply large draw-downs on reserves in bad states. To reduce the agency cost
associated with the moral hazard, the BHC securitizes low-risk assets and holds
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high-risk assets on-balance sheet. I name this channel by which only safer assets are
securitized the agency cost mechanism.
An extension of the static model discusses the optimal security structure in
the presence of agency costs and adverse selection. This extension compares two
commonly used structures in securitization: tranching and securitization with guar-
antees. Tranching eliminates agency costs but worsens adverse selection, while se-
curitization with guarantees does the opposite. When asset quality in a certain
market is sufficiently heterogeneous, and the highest quality ones are perceived to
be sufficiently safe, securitization with guarantees dominates tranching.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 reviews related litera-
ture on securitization. Section 2.3 presents the benchmark static model. Section 2.4
studies the optimality of tranching versus securitization with guarantees. Section
2.5 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
This chapter contributes to the literature by offering an economic rationale for
securitization that can explain pre-crisis securitization without risk transfer by non-
bank financial institutions that were not subject to regulatory arbitrage motives,
and post- crisis securitization under the new stringent regulatory environment.
The traditional view on securitization assumes that outside investors have a
higher risk-bearing capacity than financial institutions, and thus banks securitize
to transfer risks to outside investors (Allen and Carletti, 2006; Wagner and Marsh,
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2006). Consistent with this view, the literature on security design emphasizes the
superiority of debt-like structures in terms of overcoming adverse selection and cre-
ating a liquid market (Gorton and Pennachi, 1990; DeMarzo and Duffie, 1999; De-
Marzo, 2005; and Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom, 2009). This liquid market allows
banks to sell off loans to transfer risks to outside investors. Building on this view,
Shin (2009) and Adrian and Shin (2009) emphasize that banks securitize to tap new
funding sources. The resulting increase in the leverage of the financial sector as a
whole drives down lending standards and makes the financial system more fragile.
However, Acharya et al. (2013) show that financial intermediaries frequently
retain the risks of securitized assets by providing guarantees to security investors,
and hence coin the term “securitization without risk transfer.” Securitization with-
out risk transfer is in clear contrast with the traditional risk-transfer view, and is
interpreted by Acharya et al. (2013) as evidence supporting the regulatory-arbitrage
view on securitization. Calomiris and Mason (2004) study credit card securitization
and also find that regulatory arbitrage is an important motivation for securitization.
This view is often combined with the idea of “too big to fail” and the resulting abuse
of the public safety net. Acharya and Richardson (2009) suggest that banks provide
guarantees and retain excessive risks because they are counting on a government
bailout if things go bad.
Gornicka (2015) formalizes the regulatory-arbitrage view on securitization in
a theoretical model. Her model predicts that, under implicit guarantees, banks may
have higher incentives to monitor securitized assets, as the arbitrage motive implies
higher profits from the high leverage on the SPV, making the cost of monitoring per
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unit of securitized assets lower than that of assets on-balance sheet. This prediction
is inconsistent with the empirical finding that ex-ante similar assets have a higher
default risk if securitized (Keys et al., 2010; Elul, 2015). This inconsistency suggests
that regulatory arbitrage is not the sole explanation for securitization. Moreover,
non-bank financial insitutions that are not subject to capital regulations constitute
a significant portion of securitization markets (Ashcraft and Schuermann, 2008).
Contrary to the risk-transfer view, Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2012, 2013)
assume that banks have a higher risk capacity and a higher diversification capacity
than outside investors. In their setting, banks securitize to facilitate pooling and
diversification in order to synthesize risk-free securities demanded by risk-averse in-
vestors. Although the risk-sharing structure is consistent with securitization without
risk transfer, banks do not achieve this outcome by retaining risks but by diversi-
fying away risks. Their model abstracts from guarantees and does not explicitly
model the distinction between on- and off-balance sheet financing.
This chapter provides a novel theory of securitization based on minimizing
agency costs that does not suffer the shortcomings of the existing views. As in
Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2012, 2013), banks have a higher risk capacity than
outside investors, but my model assumes that there is aggregate non-diversifiable risk
and hence banks bear risks by providing guarantees instead of diversification. The
agency cost perspective of this paper emphasizes the difference in the magnitudes
of moral hazard under the two funding modes. The desire to reduce or overcome
agency costs rationalizes securitization and carries important implications for how
intermediaries finance different assets and monitor them ex-post.
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The static setup is flexible enough to be easily extended to a dynamic setting
to enable the study of both implicit guarantees and explicit guarantees, and the
effect of government bailouts on intermediaries’ securitization decisions, as I do in
Chapter 3. This framework can also be extended to include other market frictions
and study their interaction. Chapter 4 studies intermediaries’ ex-post monitoring
incentives in securitization.
The discussion of tranching versus securitization with guarantees in Section 2.4
is in line with Farhi and Tirole (2015), who argue that bundles are more liquid, as
they encourage information-equalizing investment. This model generates a similar
effect through the channel of agency costs and explores the optimality of tranching
versus securitization with guarantees.
This study is also related to the literature on the benefits of financial inno-
vation. Rajan (2005) argues that financial innovation has made the world better
off by expanding opportunities but cautions that innovation without an adequate
regulatory framework can make the financial system riskier. Yorulmazer (2013) de-
velops a model of credit default swaps (CDS) and shows that banks only buy cheap
CDS for regulatory arbitrage. Korinek (2012) uses a household-banker framework
to study how banks can extract rents by creating new markets. My paper suggests
a mixed effect of financial innovation. In the benchmark static model, securitiza-
tion improves welfare by increasing investment and reducing output volatility. This
result will be changed when probabilistic government bailouts become available to
distressed financial intermediaries (Chapter 3) and when an additional moral hazard
in monitoring is introduced (Chapter 4).
36
2.3 Securitization with Moral Hazard: Benchmark Static Model
2.3.1 Model Setup
Environment The economy lasts for two periods, t = 0, 1, and consists of a
banking sector with a single good. There are three types of agents – a risk-neutral
bank holding company (BHC), a risk-neutral equity investor, and a continuum of
competitive and infinitely risk-averse outside investors. The BHC consists of a bank
entity and a special purpose vehicle (SPV) if it decides to securitize assets. At t = 0,
outside investors are endowed with wealth w for consumption and investment. At
the same time, the equity investor receives an endowment A and gives it to the BHC
as equity. At t = 1, the state of the economy is realized. With probability q, the
high state is realized, and with probability 1−q, the low state is realized. All agents
receive no endowments in the second period.
There are two types of assets in this economy – a safe asset available to both
outside investors and the BHC, and a risky asset available only to the BHC. The
safe asset yields a fixed rate of return rS = 1 in the second period, while the rate of
return of the risky asset, x, is stochastic. In the high state, the risky asset yields a
rate of return H > 1 in the second period; while in the low state, it yields a rate of
return L < 1. All returns are consumed in the second period.
Outside Investors Deep-pocketed outside investors receive a large amount of
a perishable endowment w in period 0 for investment and consumption. As in
Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2013), investors are infinitely risk-averse in the
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sense that, ex-ante, they value stochastic consumption in the second period at the
worst-case scenario. This assumption is consistent with the high degree of risk
aversion seen in actual capital markets (Bernanke et al., 2011).
In the first period, outside investors invest by buying safe assets or financing
the BHC either by providing deposits or by buying asset-backed securities (ABS).
Outside investors’ aggregate endowment is assumed to be large enough to meet all
funding needs of the BHC.
The Bank Holding Company
Real Decisions The risk-neutral BHC receives capital A from the equity
investor in period 0, and divides the capital between its bank entity and SPV. The
BHC maximizes its expected profit by making real and financial decisions. Let X
be the total units of investment in the risky asset, among which XB units are kept
on-balance sheet and XS units are securitized up-front when the asset is originated.
All profits generated by the BHC are consumed by the equity investor in the second
period. To assure that the BHC has incentives to invest in the risky asset, I assume
that the expected return of the risky asset is greater than the safe return:
Assumption 1. The expected return of the risky asset is greater than 1, i.e. qH +
(1− q)L > 1.
Financial Decisions The BHC raises external funding from outside in-
vestors through deposit funding and/or securitization. The BHC finances XB units
of the risky asset on-balance sheet with deposits D and the bank entity’s capital
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AB. Under securitization, the BHC sets up an SPV and moves XS units of the risky
asset to the SPV. There is no cost of setting up an SPV, and its only role is to sell
claims on the risky asset originated by the bank entity. The SPV issues XS units
of ABS. Each ABS is backed by one unit of the risky asset and is sold at a market
price p. The sales revenue pXS and the SPV’s capital AS are used to invest in the
risky asset XS and in an amount RXS of the safe asset, to hold as reserves to honor
guarantees.
Guarantees The BHC can provide guarantees to outside investors. A guarantee
is a promise that the BHC pays ρ ∈ R+ per unit of ABS to outside investors in the
low state, e.g. an investor holding an ABS with a guarantee policy ρ gets L + ρ in
the low state and H in the high state. To make guarantees valuable to infinitely
risk-averse investors, the BHC promises to stand ready for potential payouts in all
states. This implies that the BHC must hold a certain amount of the safe asset as
reserves. Reserves are kept on the bank entity’s balance sheet.
Moral Hazard The moral hazard problem is modeled similarly to Holmstrom and
Tirole (1998): the BHC can divert a portion of the assets held on the bank entity’s
balance sheet in the second period and default. This moral hazard can be generally
interpreted as the incentive of insiders of the BHC to engage in ex-post activities
that benefit themselves but hurt outside investors. For example, insiders of a bank
may have an incentive ex-post to misuse the cash flows of assets held on-balance
sheet, or to take on excessive risks. Insiders benefit from such activities, but outside
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investors are the ones bearing losses in bad states.
A possible interpretation of the portion that the BHC can divert is that it
reflects the transparency of the bank entity’s balance sheet. More transparent fi-
nancial statements make it harder for insiders to misrepresent the level of risk taking
or to misuse the cash flows of the assets. Another interpretation of this portion is
that it reflects the degree of soft information on an asset that only the BHC pos-
sesses. Soft information is defined as information that cannot be reduced to a series
of hard numbers (Petersen, 2004). An example of an information-intensive asset is
a relationship-based small-business loan. Information intensive assets are difficult
for outside investors to value, and thus are more easily diverted by insiders. For
instance, if a bank defaults with a small business loan on its balance sheet, it is
more likely that the bank can appropriate a large portion of the actual value of the
asset, while outside investors bear sizable losses.
Let αB denote the divertable portion of the risky asset, and αS the divertable
portion of the safe reserves. I make the following assumption:
Assumption 2. Under deposit funding, the BHC can seize αB ∈ (0, 1) of the risky
asset held on-balance sheet. Under securitization, the BHC cannot seize the risky
asset in the SPV, but can seize αS ∈ (0, 1) of the safe reserves held on-balance sheet.
Knowing this, outside investors and the BHC devise a contract with incentive
payments to make the BHC indifferent in period two between defaulting and re-
maining solvent. As in Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), an efficient contract requires
outside investors to grant a portion of the returns to the BHC.
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Under deposit funding, the efficient contract features a payoff of αBL per unit
of investment to the BHC in the low state. This incentive payment makes the BHC
indifferent between defaulting or not in the low state. Since outside investors are
infinitely risk-averse, they must receive a payoff of (L−αBL) per unit of investment in
both states in equilibrium. As a result, the BHC gets the residual return H−L+αBL
in the high state. This high-state payoff ensures that the BHC will not default in the
high state, as H − L + αBL > αBH. Under securitization, investors mandate that
the BHC hold reserves in the amount of R ≥ ρ/(1− αS) per unit of investment. In
the efficient contract under securitization, the BHC gets αSR in the low state, and R
in the high state. Efficient contracts ensure that no default happens in equilibrium.
Table 2.1 tabulates the return allocation in period two between outside investors
and the BHC under each funding mode. The “N/A” in the last row means that,
under securitization, the BHC does not need to pay out anything to investors in the
high state and is entitled to keep all the reserves.
Table 2.1: Return Allocation Per Unit of Investment
Funding modes State Divertable Investors’ return Bank’s return
Deposit funding
H αBH L− αBL H − L+ αBL
L αBL L− αBL αBL
Securitization
H N/A H R
L αSR L+ ρ αSR
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2.3.2 BHC’s Optimization Problem and Equilibrium
The BHC maximizes expected total profits from traditional deposit funding
and from securitization plus any residual capital. In equilibrium, the BHC never
leaves any capital unused.
Formally, the BHC’s problem is the following:
max
AB , AS , XB , XS , rD, ρ, p, R
EΠD + EΠS + A− AB − AS,
subject to rD ≥ 1, (2.1)
min{L+ ρ,H}/p ≥ 1, (2.2)
AS + pXS ≥ XS +RXS, (2.3)
R ≥ ρ/(1− αS), (2.4)
A ≥ AB + AS. (2.5)
The terms EΠD and EΠS represent the expected returns from the bank entity
and the SPV respectively. Under the efficient contracts, they are given by:
EΠD = [q(H − L+ αBL) + (1− q)αBL]XB − AB,
and
EΠS = [qR + (1− q)αSR]XS − AS.
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(2.1) is the participation constraint for deposit investors, which says that the
return on deposits, rD = (1− αB)LXB/(XB − AB) must be at least as high as the
return on the safe asset, which is 1. (2.2) is the participation constraint for ABS
investors, which says that the rate of return on ABS, min{L + ρ,H}/p, must be
no less than 1. (2.3) is the period-one cash flow constraint of the BHC under se-
curitization, where the total financing to the SPV, AS + pXS (bank’s equity plus
ABS sales), is allocated between the risky project and safe reserves. (2.4) is the re-
serve constraint imposed by outside investors, requiring the BHC to hold a sufficient
amount of reserves in order to stand ready for guarantee payments. (2.5) says that
the BHC can use no more capital than what it receives from the equity investor.
Equilibrium The equilibrium is defined as an efficient contract between outside
investors and the BHC that specifies an allocation (AB, AS, XB, XS, ρ, R) and a price
system (p, rD) where (i) (XB, XS, ρ) maximizes the profit of the BHC, given (rD, p);
(ii) the no short-sale constraint is not violated, such that XB, XS ≥ 0 ; (iii) the price
of the ABS p and the deposit rate rD satisfy the individual participation constraints
as in (2.1) and (2.2); and (iv) the cash flow and the reserve constraints of the SPV
hold as in (2.3) and (2.4), while the capital constraint holds as in (2.5).
From the BHC’s problem, total investment X is bounded by the total capital
A and the leverage per unit of capital allowed by investors’ participation constraints.
Consequently, for a given asset, the BHC chooses the one funding mode that delivers
the highest profit. In other words, there will be no partial securitization in this
model – if a risky asset suits securitization, its entirety would be moved to the SPV.
43
Therefore, without loss of generality, I proceed by splitting the problem into two,
one under each funding mode. A novel result regarding the choice between deposit
funding and securitization is derived at the end of the section: the BHC chooses the
optimal funding mode by minimizing agency costs.
2.3.3 Deposit Funding
Under deposit funding, the BHC levers all its capital A for on-balance sheet
investment. The BHC’s problem is reduced to
max
XB , rD
EΠD = [q(H − L+ αBL) + (1− q)αBL]XB − A,
subject to rD ≥ 1, (2.6)
where rD = (1− αB)LXB/(XB − A).
Since outside investors are competitive, participation constraint (2.6) must









agency cost under dep.
[E(x)− 1] , (2.8)
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where the agency cost under deposit funding is captured by αBL.
Without incentive payments, the bank would get nothing in the low state and
H −L in the high state. Hence, the bank has the highest incentive to default in the
low state. For each unit of the risky asset, the return in the low state is L, and hence
the incentive payment making the bank indifferent between defaulting and not, i.e.
the agency rent, is αBL. Because of the moral hazard, the bank can only pledge
(1−αB)L to outside investors per unit of investment. Consequently, the bank needs
(1− L+ αBL) units of internal capital per unit of investment, resulting in the level
of investment given by (2.7).
In other words, outside investors require the bank to hold more capital to
protect themselves from the moral hazard, and since the bank only has a fixed
amount of capital, a higher moral hazard implies a lower leverage and investment.
In the absence of moral hazard (αB = 0), the agency cost is zero, and the pledgeable
return is L. Therefore, the first-best level of investment is given by XFB = A
1−L ,
where “FB” stands for “first-best.”
2.3.4 Securitization with Explicit Guarantees
Under securitization, the BHC finances the risky asset by selling ABS through
an off-balance sheet SPV. Sale proceeds of ABS are used to finance the risky asset
and the safe asset held as reserves. The BHC chooses the levels of investment and
guarantees. A higher level of guarantees increases the price of ABS but exposes the
BHC to risks associated with the asset, thus reducing leverage. Since the BHC is
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risk neutral and outside investors are risk-averse, the optimal risk sharing structure
is the BHC bearing all the risks through providing full guarantees. In this section, I
show that there is a minimum level of guarantee that is necessary for an active ABS
market to exist. In equilibrium, the BHC optimally synthesizes risk-free securities
out of risky assets.
Under securitization, the BHC levers its capital A for off-balance sheet invest-
ment to maximize expected profits as follows:
max
XS ,ρ, p, R
EΠS = [qR + (1− q)αSR]XS − A,
subject to min{L+ ρ,H}/p ≥ 1, (2.9)
A+ pXS ≥ XS +RXS, (2.10)
R ≥ ρ/(1− αS). (2.11)
Because outside investors are competitive, participation constraint (2.9) must
bind, and hence the price of ABS will be given by p = min {L+ ρ,H}. Investors’ in-
finite risk-aversion narrows the range of ρ to [0, H−L]. When ρ = H−L, we say that
the BHC is providing full guarantees to its ABS investors. Since E(x) > 1, (2.10)




Using this, one can re-write EΠS as EΠS(XS) = [(L+ ρ)− ((1− q)ρ+ 1)]XS. For
a market to exist, the price of ABS, L+ρ, must exceed the issuance cost, (1−q)ρ+1,
and hence the guarantees must reach a minimum level.
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When ρ ≥ ρ̂, an active ABS market exists, and the BHC earns a positive unit profit
π = L+ qρ− 1, which is increasing in ρ.
One can check that EΠS is increasing in ρ, and hence in equilibrium the BHC
provides full guarantees, i.e. ρ = H−L. Therefore, the BHC’s expected profit under





1− αS︸ ︷︷ ︸
agency cost under sec.
[E(x)− 1] , (2.12)




the price of the ABS is p = H, and the guaranteed ABS yields a rate of return equal
to 1.
In the low state, guarantee payments are due, and the BHC has the highest




the incentive payment making the BHC indifferent between defaulting and not, i.e.
the agency rent, is αS
H−L
1−αS
. Again, moral hazard reduces leverage and investment,
and in the absence of moral hazard (αS = 0), the BHC achieves the first-best level
of investment XFB = A
1−L under securitization, and we are back in the Modigliani
– Miller world.
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2.3.5 Optimal Funding Mode and Agency Cost
Having separately derived the expected profits under deposit funding and se-
curitization, the BHC chooses the funding mode that delivers the highest profit.
For a given asset, this choice boils down to maximizing leverage, or, equivalently,
minimizing agency costs, across funding modes. From equations (2.8) and (2.12),
securitization is strictly preferred if the agency cost under securitization is smaller
than that under deposit funding.




This result implies three observations.
Agency Cost and Information Intensity The agency cost is the product of
the agency rate, the level of information intensity, and the agency base, the unit
value of the asset held on-balance sheet. Under deposit funding, the agency rate is
αB and the agency base is simply L. Hence, the agency cost under deposit funding
is linear in αB. Under securitization, the agency rate is αS and the agency base
is H−L
1−αS
. Hence, the agency cost under securitization is quadratic in αS. For assets
with high information intensity, both the agency rate and agency base are high under
securitization.
A reduction in the information intensity of the safe reserves increases the
profitability of securitizing riskier assets. When αS  αB, securitization may be the
most profitable funding mode, even for an asset with a high level of risk, i.e. high
H −L, which implies a large agency base. This could be the case when reserves are
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standardized safe assets, e.g. U.S. Treasury securities.
Return Structure and the Agency Cost Mechanism To see how agency costs
vary with the mean and the standard deviation of the binomial return distribution,
I conduct two experiments. First, I increase the level of risk (standard deviation of
the return) in a mean-preserving fashion. Second, I fix the level of risk but increase








µ = E(x) and σ = std(x). Using this formulation, the agency costs under the two
funding modes are given by:
















The deposit funding agency cost is increasing in µ and decreasing in σ. Under
deposit funding, for a given risk level, a higher mean return implies a higher return
in the low state, leading to a higher agency cost. For a given mean return, a higher
risk implies a lower return in the low state, implying a lower agency cost. On the
contrary, the agency cost under securitization is not affected by the mean return and
is increasing in the risk level. Higher risks imply larger reserves in securitization,
and hence higher agency costs. For a given information intensity, an asset’s return
structure determines its optimal funding mode: an asset with low risk and high mean
return is most likely to be securitized. When there are multiple assets, the BHC
ranks assets according to both expected return and agency cost. This is discussed
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in Section 2.3.7.
I use the term agency cost mechanism to refer to the channel by which safer
assets are securitized and riskier ones are held on-balance sheet in the benchmark
static model. High-risk assets generate low agency costs under deposit funding, but
high agency costs under securitization.
Output and Welfare For a given asset, when only deposit funding is allowed,
the level of investment is given by A
1−L+αBL
; after the introduction of securitization,








ritization weakly increases total investment and the expected aggregate output. If
investment in the risky asset is socially optimal, securitization also increases welfare.
2.3.6 Threshold Information Intensity
In the previous section, I discussed the case of αS  αB, in which it can be
optimal to securitize risky assets due to the low information intensity of reserves. To
emphasize the role of agency costs, I henceforth assume that the divertable portion
of the risky asset and the reserves are identical, i.e. αB = αS = α. This assumption
also suits better the interpretation of the divertable portion as representing the
transparency of financial statements. Since the deposit funding agency cost is linear
in α and the securitization agency cost is quadratic in α, there is a unique threshold
information intensity, below which securitization strictly dominates.
Corollary 1. Assuming αB = αS = α, there is a unique threshold information
intensity α0 = 2 − H/L. For α ∈ [0, α0), securitization with guarantees strictly
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dominates deposit funding. For α ∈ (α0, 1], deposit funding strictly dominates.
When α = α0, the BHC is indifferent between deposit funding and securitization.
The threshold α0 is increasing in L and decreasing in H.
To see how the risk level affects this threshold information intensity, I re-write
α0 in terms of the mean µ and the standard deviation σ of the binomial return
distribution.










increasing in µ and decreasing in σ.
From Corollary 2, riskier assets have a lower threshold level of information in-
tensity and are less likely to be securitized. Again, this is the agency cost mechanism
– the agency cost in risk taking is high under securitization but low under deposit
funding.
What to Securitize? The predictions of the static model are in line with the
observation that mortgage loans are much more likely to be securitized than small
business loans. In the context of the model, the high-state return of a loan asset is
the full payment with interest, while the low-state return is what banks get when
borrowers default. In general, small business loans carry higher interest rates and
are riskier than mortgage loans. With residential property as collateral, banks get
the market value of the house if a mortgage borrower defaults. Although small
business loans also have physical capital as collateral, the value of business capital
depreciates considerably if the business fails. From the lens of this model, the
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high return volatility of small business loans elevates the securitization agency cost,
making securitization undesirable. Also, α is presumably higher for small business
loans than mortgages, increasing the agency costs associated with securitizing small
business loans.
Prior to the recent crisis, the ABS market was particularly concentrated in
mortgage assets (Gorton and Metrick, 2010). One explanation is the optimism
regarding collateral values of real estate. In a booming housing market, banks
believed that they could quickly sell these assets at minimal loss in the event of
default. Optimism and low mortgage interest rates translate into a high L and low
H, making securitization particularly profitable.
Another example of securitization with guarantees is credit card securitization.
Individual credit card loans carry high interest rates and can be highly risky, but
the associated risks are idiosyncratic and hence diversifiable.
2.3.7 Agency Costs and Asset Ranking
In an environment with multiple limited-supplied assets, the introduction of
securitization alters the BHC’s ranking of assets. From (2.8) and (2.12), the BHC



























If securitization is not an option, the BHC ranks assets according to ΥB. When





conduct four experiments to illustrate how securitization affects the rank of assets.
In the first three experiments, I vary only one of three parameters of the risky asset
(α, µ, σ) and keep the other two unchanged. In the fourth experiment, I vary two
parameters at the same time. Recall that µ and σ are the mean and the standard
deviation of the binomial stochastic return x.
Panel A of Figure 2.1 plots the scores of assets with the same α and µ but
different σ. Both scores are declining in the level of risk, with the securitization
score higher at low risk levels. Similarly, panel B plots the scores of assets with the
same α and σ but different µ. The effect of mean return on the optimal funding
mode is very weak. In almost all parameterizations, the two scores do not cross for
a wide range of µ. However, the advantage of a certain funding mode increases with
µ. In the plotted parametrization, securitization dominates deposit funding because
of the low σ, and the advantage of securitization over deposit funding is increasing
in µ. For a higher σ, deposit funding would dominate, and its advantage would
also increase in µ. Panel C plots the scores of assets with the same µ and σ but
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different α. Securitization dominates for assets with lower information intensity. In
these three experiments, with both funding modes available, the ranking score is
the upper contour of the two curves. Although for some assets the optimal funding
mode is changed, the rank is preserved.
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Figure 2.1: Scores of Assets










































When assets differ in more than one dimension, the rank can be altered by
the introduction of securitization. Figure 2.2 plots iso-profit curves under deposit
funding and securitization for assets with a given α but different µ and σ. As the
profit under securitization is more sensitive to the risk level, the iso-profit curve
under securitization is flatter than that under deposit funding, and they cross at
point A. To the north-east of A, deposit funding dominates, and to the south-west
of A, securitization dominates. Imagine there are two assets, given by point A and B
– an arbitrary point between the two indifference curves to the left of A. With only
deposit funding available, A achieves higher profits. The bank would first invest
in A using deposits and then move to B. With both funding modes available, the
preference is reversed. In the region of B, securitization is the preferred funding
mode, and according to the iso-profit curve under securitization, B is superior to
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A. Therefore, the BHC would prioritize securitizing B and then securitize A. The
introduction of securitization elevates the rank of assets with low risk and low mean
return.
2.4 Optimal Security Structure with Moral Hazard
2.4.1 Overview
This section explores the optimality of two commonly used security designs in
securitization, namely tranching and securitization with guarantees.
As discussed in the previous section, securitization with guarantees involves
selling an entire asset to risk-averse outside investors. By providing full guaran-
tees, banks synthesize risk-free securities out of risky assets to appeal to outside
investors’ demand for safe assets. To stand ready for potential guarantee payments,
banks have to hold reserves on-balance sheet. Due to the moral hazard of insiders
diverting assets, holding reserves on-balance sheet inflicts agency costs on banks
using securitization with guarantees.
Another security structure that can be employed to meet the demand for safe
assets is tranching. In tranching, the return of the risky asset is “tranched” into a
safe component and a risky component, and the two components are sold separately.
The safe component is called the senior tranche, while the risky one is referred to as
the junior tranche or equity tranche. Facing demand for risk-free assets, banks sell
the senior tranche and retain the equity tranche. In this way, banks do not have to
hold reserves to satisfy outside investors, and as a result, the agency costs associated
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with reserves can be avoided.
Therefore, tranching can be superior to securitization with guarantees in that
it avoids agency costs. However, when information on the underlying asset is asym-
metric between banks and outside investors, tranching can suffer a higher degree
of adverse selection than securitization with guarantees. Since only a piece of the
underlying asset is being sold, it is harder for outside investors to identify the quality
of the asset under asymmetric information. The optimal security structure therefore
entails a trade-off between reducing agency costs and overcoming adverse selection.
This section shows that securitization with guarantees is the optimal structure
when the assets being securitized are sufficiently heterogeneous in quality and the
highest quality assets are perceived to be sufficiently safe. This prediction is con-
sistent with the popularity of securitization with guarantees in the pre-crisis ABCP
market, whose underlying assets were mostly residential mortgages and RMBS. In
most cases, ABCP conduits only disclose rough compositions of the underlying pool
of assets but never the asset-specific information of the portfolio to outside investors.
The introduction of subprime mortgages and the many new types within subprime
made the underlying assets of ABCPs more heterogeneous in quality, while the hous-
ing boom and the low interest rates caused prime mortgages be considered very safe
prior to the crisis.
I extend the benchmark static model to allow for asymmetric information on
asset quality. I assume that there are two types of asset (a good type and a “lemon”
type), and the type is privately revealed to the BHC but not investors. Before
meeting with outside investors, the BHC observes the asset type and the cost to
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signal. After observing these, the BHC decides whether or not to send a signal
saying that the asset is a good one (henceforth a signal) and simultaneously chooses
the security structure. Since the BHC chooses the security structure after observing
its type and the signaling cost, the BHC can potentially use both the signal and
security structure to indicate the quality of the asset.
Signaling incurs a fixed cost that is paid using the BHC’s capital. This cost
can be interpreted as the BHC’s expenses on advertising and marketing, or the cost
to obtain a good rating from rating agencies. While I assume that it is more costly
for the BHC to signal for a lemon, the benefit of signaling may sometime exceed the
cost, and as a result, pooling equilibria may arise.
As investors are infinitely risk-averse and signaling is costly, in a pooling equi-
librium, the BHC never signals regardless of asset quality. When the cost to signal
is sufficiently high for a lemon and sufficiently low for a good asset, a separating
equilibrium arises, and investors can identify a bank’s type according to the observed
signal and security structure.
In this section, I first characterize the range of the signaling cost for a good
asset and for a lemon respectively that can sustain a separating equilibrium under
each security structure. In this part, I assume that the BHC takes security structure
as given ex-ante.
With the advancement of information technology, the gap in the cost of sig-
naling between lemons and good assets has arguably decreased over time. Assuming
that signaling is sufficiently cheap for good assets under either security structure,
the key question is then how costly signaling for a lemon has to be to induce a
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separating equilibrium under the two security structures. Therefore, the analysis fo-
cuses on the lower bound of the signaling cost for a lemon, above which a separating
equilibrium exists.
I show that the minimum signaling cost for a lemon is lower when an asset is
securitized whole-piece with guarantees, suggesting that whole-piece securitization
has an advantage in overcoming adverse selection. This outcome is consistent with
Farhi and Tirole (2015), who show that bundles encourage information-equalizing
investments, and thereby facilitate trade.
Intuitively, signaling affects the BHC’s expected profit by ameliorating adverse
selection. In tranching, given the absence of agency costs, adverse selection is the
only friction that parts the BHC from its first-best profit. As a result, signaling has
a larger effect on profit under tranching, which increases the temptation for a bad
bank to signal. By contrast, the agency costs in whole-piece securitization reduce
the benefit of signaling, thereby increasing the credibility of low-cost signals.
Even though this result is the same outcome as Farhi and Tirole (2015), the
mechanism is completely different. In Farhi and Tirole (2015), bundles, or whole-
pieces, are harder to trade with asymmetric information, and therefore encourage
information-equalizing investment. Here, the agency costs in whole-piece securiti-
zation reduce the effectiveness of signaling in boosting profits, and as a result, the
incentive to send a fake positive signal is weaker.
After establishing the superiority of securitization with guarantees in overcom-
ing adverse selection, I study the trade-off between securitization with guarantees
and tranching when security structure is chosen endogenously while making signaling
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decisions.
The BHC internalizes the effect of security structure on the type of equilibrium
that can be sustained. Three kinds of situations may arise. (I) On the one extreme,
if the observed signaling cost for a lemon is sufficiently high, a separating equilibrium
can arise under either security structure. Given that tranching helps the BHC avoid
agency costs, the optimal security structure is tranching.
(II) On the other extreme, if the observed signaling cost for a lemon is suffi-
ciently low, a separating equilibrium could never exist under either security struc-
ture. In this case, no one signals, and the optimal security structure is again tranch-
ing.
(III) With an intermediate signaling cost for a lemon, security structure affects
equilibrium type. In this case, a separating equilibrium can be sustained under
securitization with guarantees but not under tranching. Thus, with an intermediate
signaling cost for a lemon, a good bank can potentially use both a signal and the
security structure of securitization with guarantees to stand out.
The exact cutoff signaling cost for a lemon that differentiates cases (II) and
(III) comes from the incentive compatibility constraint that ensures a bad bank using
tranching would better off not signaling. This constraint yields the minimum sig-
naling cost for a lemon that can sustain a separating equilibrium under endogenous
security structure.
Finally, I characterize equilibrium outcomes for both good and bad banks at
different levels of the signaling cost for a lemon. I present the condition under
which tranching is dominated by securitization with guarantees: for a good bank,
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it is optimal to securitize with guarantees when adverse selection is severe and the
underlying risky asset is relatively safe.
2.4.2 Setup
The BHC has access to one asset, and the quality of the asset is revealed only
to the BHC before it meets with outside investors. A good asset yields H > 1 in
the high state and L < 1 in the low state, while a “lemon” yields the same in the
high state but L− δ in the low state. For simplicity, I label the BHC a “good bank”
if the asset quality is revealed to be good and a “bad bank” otherwise.
After observing the quality of the asset, the BHC observes the cost to signal.
Sending a positive signal incurs a fixed cost Cg if the asset is a good one, or Cb if the
asset is a lemon. Both Cg and Cb are observable: the BHC observes its own signaling
cost and the signaling cost of the other type, and outside investors observe the two
costs as well. The signaling cost is paid by the BHC, using its own capital, A. After
observing the asset quality and the signaling cost, the BHC decides whether or not to
send a positive signal and announces a security structure. Throughout this section,
to focus on the analysis of security structure, I assume that the only funding mode
available is securitization. Or equivalently, the following analysis is conducted in
the parameter space where securitization under either structure dominates deposit
funding.
After observing the signal and security structure, investors form beliefs about
the quality of the asset and provide funds to the BHC accordingly.
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I assume that it is more costly to signal if the BHC is a bad bank. Formally,
this assumption is given by:
Cg < Cb,
where the subscript “g” stands for good and “b” stands for bad.
To make the question interesting, I assume that banks have enough capital to
signal regardless asset quality:
Cb < A.
Note that all results in this section are robust to whether the signaling cost
is fixed or proportional. Appendix B presents the analysis in an alternative setting
where the signaling cost is proportional to the level of investment. One caveat
is that, when the cost of signaling is proportional, full pre-payment may not be
possible. In the Appendix, I assume that the bank has a separate source of working
capital to finance the cost of signaling and repays in full at the end of the second
period before allocating returns to outside investors.
Under each security structure, two types of equilibria may arise in this signaling
setting: a pooling equilibrium in which both types either always signal or do not
signal; and a separating equilibrium in which only the good type signals.
Since investors are infinitely risk-averse and signaling is costly, from the BHC’s
perspective, there is no point to signal in a pooling equilibrium, as investors would
always treat the asset as a lemon. Thus, the BHC only signals when a separating
equilibrium can exist. Therefore, when a certain security structure is superior in
terms of inducing a separating equilibrium, it is equivalent to conclude that this
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security structure encourages information-equalizing investment, using the termi-
nology of Farhi and Tirole (2015).
In the following two subsections, I derive the threshold signaling costs that
can sustain a separating equilibrium.
2.4.3 Signaling under Securitization with Guarantees
This section characterizes the sufficient set of conditions on the signaling cost
under which a separating equilibrium arises under securitization with guarantees.
In this section, I assume that the BHC takes as given that it can only offer whole-
piece securitization with guarantees. Later, we will allow the BHC to choose either
whole-piece securitization or tranching.
For a separating equilibrium to exist, two incentive compatibility constraints
must be satisfied – one that ensures that a bad bank would not signal, and one that
ensures that a good bank would signal. In other words, it must be (i) sufficiently
cheap for a good bank to signal and (ii) sufficiently expensive for a bad bank not to
signal. I start by characterizing the threshold signaling cost that satisfies incentive
compatibility (i).
Let µ = qH+(1−q)L denote the expected return on a good asset. Recall that
the low-state return of a “lemon” is L− δ, and hence, with symmetric information,
the agency cost per unit of asset for a lemon under securitization with guarantees is
α
1−α(H − L+ δ).
Conditional on a separating belief, when a good bank signals, investors believe
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that the low state return of the asset is L, and the agency cost per unit of asset is
then α





Since the BHC has to use some of its capital to signal, the residual capital
available to lever up is A − C, and therefore a good bank that signals achieves a






where the superscript “g” stands for a good bank, and the subscript “eq” indicates
that the BHC stays on the equilibrium path. It immediately follows that the equi-






Now consider the case where a good bank deviates from the equilibrium path
and does not signal. In this case, investors do not observe the signal and believe
that the low state return of the asset is L− δ, and the agency cost per unit of asset
is then α
1−α(H − L+ δ). Conditional on this belief, the level of investment that the
BHC can achieve is
Xgoffeq =
A
1− L+ δ + α
1−α(H − L+ δ)
.
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In this case, the high state payoff per unit of asset to the BHC is the entire
reserve 1
1−α(H − L + δ). Note that, in this case, the asset is good, but investors
requires the BHC to hold more reserves than necessary as they believe the asset is
a lemon based on the missing signal. As a result, if the low state is realized, the
BHC does not need to pay out H −L+ δ, but just H −L to make investors happy.
Therefore, the low state payoff to the BHC per unit of asset is 1
1−α(H − L + δ) −
(H −L), which are the residual reserves after paying out the necessary payments to










H − L+ δ
1− α
− (H − L)
)]
− A. (2.13)
One can easily show that (2.13) is equivalent to
πgoffeq =
A
1− L+ δ + α
1−α(H − L+ δ)
(µ− 1) .
To induce a good bank to stay on the equilibrium path and signal, the equi-
librium profit must be not smaller than the off-equilibrium profit, i.e. πgeq ≥ π
g
offeq.
This condition gives rise to the maximum signaling cost for a good bank under whole-
piece securitization with guarantees that can sustain a separating equilibrium:
Cg ≤ C̄Wg ,
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(µ− 1)− C̄Wg =
A (µ− 1)
1− L+ δ + α
1−α(H − L+ δ)
. (2.14)
Intuitively, in a separating equilibrium, on the one hand, signaling has the
benefit of increasing investment, captured by the two δs in the denominator on the
right-hand side. But on the other hand, signaling subtracts from the BHC’s capital,
which is not only a fixed cost, as captured by the second term on the left-hand
side, but also a restraint on the level of investment, as captured by the C̄Wg in the
numerator of the first term on the left-hand side. For a good bank to signal in
equilibrium, the cost must be sufficiently small.
Now I turn to characterize the threshold signaling cost that satisfies incentive
compatibility constraint (ii): it is sufficiently expensive to signal so that a bad bank
would not signal.
Conditional on a separating belief, if a bad bank does not signal, investors
believe that the low-state return is L − δ, and the agency cost per unit of asset is
α
1−α(H − L + δ). It is easy to see that the expected profit on the equilibrium path
under securitization with guarantees is given by:
πbeq =
A
1− L+ δ + α
1−α(H − L+ δ)
[µ− 1− (1− q)δ] .
Now consider the case where a bad bank deviates and sends a signal. In this
case, conditional on a separating belief, investors will think that the asset is good
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and the pleageable return per unit of asset is L − α
1−α(H − L). Under this belief,






In this case, the high state payoff to the BHC per unit of asset is the entire
reserve holding 1
1−α(H−L). In the low state, the BHC will fall short of the reserves
needed to pay off investors in full, and when this happens, the BHC defaults and
diverts α of the reserve holding 1
1−α(H − L). Therefore, the low state payoff to the
BHC is α



















For a given C and conditional on a separating belief, the off-equilibrium expected
profit of a bad bank is the same as the equilibrium expected profit of a good bank,
πgeq.
The incentive compatibility constraint to ensure that a bad bank does not
signal is πbeq ≥ πboffeq, which yields the minimum signaling cost for a lemon needed
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to sustain a separating equilibrium as:
Cb ≥ CWb ,
where CWb satisfies the following equation:
A [µ− 1− (1− q)δ]
1− L+ δ + α





(µ− 1)− CWb . (2.16)
Intuitively, the cost of signaling must be high enough to outweigh the benefit
of signaling for a bad bank. In a separating equilibrium, signaling increases not only
the level of investment, captured by the two δs in the denominator on the left-hand
side, but also the unit profit, captured by the δ in the numerator on the left-hand
side. This is because the BHC can always default in the low state and seize a fraction
of the reserves, which makes a bad bank’s payoff equal to a good bank’s payoff in
the low state. Again, the signaling cost is both a fixed cost and a restraint on the
level of investment, as the BHC uses its own capital to pay for the signal.
This lower bound, CWb , is of particular interest. Given the advancement of
information technology, signaling has arguably become less costly, so it has become
less likely that the upper bound on the signaling cost for a good bank is the bind-
ing constraint. Hence, the lower bound for a bad bank is increasingly crucial in
determining the type of equilibrium that arises.
It is easy to check using (2.14) and (2.16) that CWb > C̄
W
g , which is intuitive,
because for a separating equilibrium to arise, it is a necessary condition that the
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cost for a bad bank to signal is higher than that for a good bank. Otherwise, the
BHC would always signal, and a separating equilibrium could never exist.
I summarize the above results in the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Under securitization with guarantees (whole-piece securitization), the
necessary and sufficient condition for a separating equilibrium to exist is:
Cg ≤ C̄Wg and Cb ≥ CWb ,
where C̄Wg and C
W
b are the solutions to equation (2.14) and (2.16) respectively.
2.4.4 Signaling under Tranching
This section repeats the same exercise for the case in which the BHC must
divide the asset’s returns into two tranches. In tranching, the return of the asset is
split into a safe part, i.e. the senior tranche, and a risky part, i.e the junior tranche,
and the two parts are sold separately. Facing demand for risk-free assets from outside
investors, the BHC sells the senior tranche and retains the junior tranche. In this
way, the BHC is not holding reserves liable to outside investors, and thus the agency
costs associated with holding reserves can be avoided.
For a good asset, the low state return is L, and hence the fair price of the senior
tranche of one unit of the good asset is L. Therefore, the level of investment under
symmetric information is A
1−L . For a lemon, the low state return is L − δ, the fair
price of the senior tranche is L− δ, and thus the full-information level of investment
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is A
1−L+δ . The payoff to the BHC is the residual return in the high state and low
state. With symmetric information, the residual return to the junior tranche is 0 in
the low state. In the high state, the residual return to the BHC is H −L for a good
asset and H − L+ δ for a lemon.
Following the same logic in the previous section, the equilibrium payoff of a





In the case where a good bank deviates from the equilibrium path and does




[q(H − L+ δ) + (1− q)δ]− A.
This expression arises because, conditional on a separating belief, a missing
signal reduces the level of investment to A
1−L+δ , and investors expect to get L−δ per
unit of the senior tranche in either state. In the high state where the asset yields
H, the residual return is H − L + δ. In the low state, investors only expect L − δ,






In a separating equilibrium, the incentive constraint πgeq ≥ π
g
offeq must hold,
from which the maximum signaling cost for a good bank to sustain a separating
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equilibrium is:
Cg ≤ C̄Tg ,
where C̄Tg satisfies the following equation:
A− C̄Tg
1− L
(µ− 1)− C̄Tg =
A
1− L+ δ
(µ− 1) . (2.17)




[µ− 1− (1− q)δ] .
In the case where a bad bank deviates from the equilibrium path and signals,
the level of investment would be A−C
1−L , and investors would expect to get L in both
states. In the high state, the asset yields H, and the BHC gets the residual H − L.
However, in the low state, the asset yields L− δ, which is less than what investors
are expecting. In this case, the residual return to the BHC is 0, and investors would





[q(H − L) + (1− q)0]− A,





In a separating equilibrium, the incentive constraint πbeq ≥ πboffeq must hold,
from which the minimum signaling cost for a bad bank to sustain a separating
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equilibrium is:
Cb ≥ CTb ,
where CTb satisfies the following equation:
A
1− L+ δ




(µ− 1)− CTb . (2.18)
The two thresholds for the cost of signaling under tranching are summarized
in the following lemma:
Lemma 3. Under tranching, the necessary and sufficient condition for a separating
equilibrium to exist is:
Cg ≤ C̄Tg and Cb ≥ CTb ,
where C̄Tg and C
T
b are the solutions to equation (2.17) and (2.18) respectively.
Again, it is easy to check that CTb > C̄
T
g . The minimum signaling cost for a bad
bank must be higher than that for a good bank to support a separating equilibrium.
2.4.5 Optimal Security Structure
Having characterized the range of signaling costs that can sustain a separating
equilibrium under each given security structure, I now turn to the case in which the
BHC can choose the security structure as well as whether or not to signal.
To lay a foundation for studying the case of an endogenous security structure,
I first compare the range of signaling costs under the two structures that can sustain
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a separating equilibrium.
Comparing CWb defined in Lemma 2 and C
T
b defined in Lemma 3, one can get
the following result. See Appendix A for proof.
Lemma 4. When there is moral hazard, i.e. α ∈ (0, 1), the minimum signaling cost
for a bad bank to sustain a separating equilibrium is higher under tranching than




This result suggests that securitization with guarantees has an advantage in
overcoming adverse selection. If the cost of signaling is generally low due to advances
in information technology, Lemma 4 implies that it is easier to sustain a separating
equilibrium under securitization with guarantees than under tranching. Since the
BHC only pays to signal if a separating equilibrium can arise, this implies that
whole-piece securitization has an advantage in encouraging information-equalizing
investment, using the language of Farhi and Tirole (2015).
Intuitively, when agency costs are absent, as in the case of tranching, adverse
selection is the only friction that parts the BHC from its first-best profit. As a result,
signaling has a larger effect on profit under tranching, which increases the temptation
for a bad bank to signal. By contrast, the agency costs in whole-piece securitization
reduce the impact of signaling on profit, thereby increasing the credibility of low-cost
signals.
Even though this result is the same outcome as Farhi and Tirole (2015), the
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mechanism is completely different. In Farhi and Tirole (2015), bundles, or whole-
pieces, are harder to trade with asymmetric information, and therefore encourage
information-equalizing investment. Here, the agency costs in whole-piece securiti-
zation reduce the effectiveness of signaling in boosting profits, and as a result, the
incentive to send a fake positive signal is weaker.
This result is very important in deriving the optimal security structure, as it
shows that, in a certain intermediate range of signaling cost for a lemon, the security
structure affects the type of equilibrium that can arise.
In what follows, I derive the minimum signaling cost for a lemon that defines
the lower bound of this intermediate range. The upper bound is naturally the
minimum signaling cost for a lemon under tranching. These two bounds divide the
equilibrium outcomes into three cases. I characterize, in each case, outside investors’
beliefs, the BHC’s signaling decision, and the optimal security structure.
Note that, in the previous two sections, security structure was taken as exoge-
nous when deriving the threshold signaling cost to sustain a separating equilibrium.
In the following, I allow the BHC to choose security structure simultaneously with
its choice of whether or not to signal, internalizing that whole-piece securitization
has an advantage in overcoming adverse selection.
High Signaling Cost When Cb ≥ CTb , where CTb is the solution to (2.18), a
separating equilibrium exists under either security design. Since tranching helps the
BHC avoid agency costs, the BHC would always choose to tranche the asset, and
therefore the condition in (2.18) still applies. Knowing that the signaling cost for a
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lemon is sufficiently high, outside investors believe that the asset is good whenever
they see a signal, under both security structures. In this case, only a good bank
signals.
Low Signaling Cost When Cb < C
T
b , a separating equilibrium could never arise
if the BHC used tranching. In this case, whole-piece securitization with guarantees
can potentially play a role in helping a good bank overcome adverse selection.
In this region, there are two cases. First, imagine that the signaling cost for
a bad bank is lower than a certain threshold, say ĈWb . In this case, a separating
equilibrium could never arise even when the BHC uses securitization with guaran-
tees. With no hope of arriving at a separating equilibrium, the BHC would never
signal, and since there is no benefit from using securitization with guarantees, it
would always use tranching to avoid agency costs.
When the signaling cost for a bad bank increases to a level higher than ĈWb
but lower than CTb , a good bank would signal under securitization with guarantees,
but not under tranching. In this region, a separating equilibrium can be sustained
under securitization with guarantees. To ensure that a separating equilibrium can
indeed exist, we just need to make sure that a bad bank would be better off not
signaling. In Section 2.4.3, I evaluated the off-equilibrium expected profit of a bad
bank that signals under securitization with guarantees, where security structure was
given exogenously. Here, the BHC can choose its security structure, and since
tranching avoids agency costs, the expected profit of a bad bank in a separating
equilibrium should be evaluated under the security structure of tranching.
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Therefore, to ensure that a bad bank would indeed better off not signaling,
the following condition must hold:






The left hand side is the expected profit of a bad bank when it does not signal and
it tranches. The right hand side is the expected profit if a bad bank signals and
chooses whole-piece securitization in order to pool with the good bank.
This condition yields the minimum signaling cost for a bad bank under en-
dogenous security structure to sustain a separating equilibrium, ĈWb , which is the
solution to the following equation:






(µ− 1)− ĈWb . (2.19)
Comparing equation (2.16) and (2.19), one can easily see that the minimum
signaling cost for a lemon under endogenous security structure is lower than that
under exogenous security structure, i.e. ĈWb < C
W
b . Intuitively, giving a bad bank
the flexibility of choosing security structure increases its equilibrium expected profit,
making it less tempting to send a fake signal.
It follows that, when Cb ≤ ĈWb , signaling for a lemon is too cheap, and thus a
separating equilibrium could never exist under either security structure. In a pooling
equilibrium, outside investors’ beliefs are that there is always a non-zero chance that
a signaling bank is a bad bank. Therefore, out of infinite risk-aversion, they provide
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the bad-bank level of funding, regardless of the signal and the security structure
that the BHC uses. Since signaling is costly, and there is no hope for a separating
equilibrium, the BHC would never signal and would always tranche to avoid agency
costs.
Intermediate Signaling Cost Now suppose that Cb ∈ (ĈWb , CTb ). In this region,
a separating equilibrium could not exist under tranching, but it could arise under
securitization with guarantees. This means that a good bank, after observing a
signaling cost in this range, can use security structure as an additional signal to stand
out from bad banks. In other words, signals are more credible under securitization
with guarantees when the signaling cost falls in this range.
If Cb is in this range, an outside investor who observes that the bank signals
and chooses to securitize with guarantees can be sure that this bank is a good bank.
By contrast, if the signaling bank tranches, outside investors recognize that, under
tranching, sending fake signals is more tempting, and hence they would regard the
signal as a fake one. In other words, with an intermediate signaling cost, a good
bank can never overcome the adverse selection by signaling if it chooses to tranche.
The BHC chooses its ex-ante optimal security structure internalizing outside
investors’ beliefs.
I first study the optimal security design for a good bank. In this region, a good
bank faces the following trade-off. If it securitizes with guarantees, it suffers agency
costs but can signal effectively and overcome the adverse selection. The resulting
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(µ− 1)− Cg. (2.20)
If a good bank tranches the asset, it would not be able to overcome the adverse
selection, since a separating equilibrium does not exist in this case. Therefore, it
would simply not signal, the level of investment is A
1−L+δ , and the resulting expected




(µ− 1) . (2.21)
Using (2.20) and (2.21), for a good bank, tranching is optimal if
A
1− L+ δ
(µ− 1) > A− Cg
1− L+ α
1−α(H − L)
(µ− 1)− Cg. (2.22)
When the signaling cost for a good bank approaches zero, i.e. Cg → 0, condi-
tion (2.22) converges to:
A
1− L+ δ




The above condition boils down to a comparison between δ and α
1−α(H − L).
This result suggests that, with an intermediate level of signaling cost, tranching is
the optimal security structure for a good bank when assets are similar but risky,
meaning that δ is low but (H−L) is high. Intuitively, when assets are more hetero-
geneous, the cost of not being able to credibly signal one’s type is high, and therefore
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tranching is dominated by whole-piece securitization, which is more efficient in over-
coming adverse selection. Conversely, when assets are highly risky, the high agency
costs imposed by the use of guarantees render whole-piece securitization relatively
unprofitable.
Lastly, I characterize the optimal security design for a bad bank. In this region,
a bad bank would not signal under securitization with guarantees, because it is too
costly. It would also not signal under tranching, because there is no hope for a
separating equilibrium. Therefore, with an intermediate signaling cost, a bad bank
would never signal and would always choose tranching.
Summarizing the above analysis, the BHC’s optimal signaling decision and
security structure is given by the following proposition.







in equilibrium, the BHC’s signaling decision and the optimal security structure follow
the rules below:
1. A bad bank never signals and its optimal security structure is tranching;
2. If Cb ≥ CTb , a good bank signals and its optimal security structure is tranch-
ing, where CTb satisfies (2.18);
3. If Cb ≤ ĈWb , a good bank never signals and its optimal security structure is
tranching, where ĈWb satisfies (2.19);
4. If Cb ∈ (ĈWb , CTb ), a good bank does not signal and its optimal security
structure is tranching if condition (2.22) holds; otherwise, a good bank signals
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and its optimal security structure is whole-piece securitization with guarantees.
Relating this result to the ABCP market prior to the recent financial crisis, I
interpret the good asset and the “lemon” as various types of the underlying assets
of ABCPs. The return differential δ captures the heterogeneity in the quality of
assets backing ABCPs. The high- and low-state returns, H and L, represent the
average range of returns of good underlying assets. From the lens of this simple
model, the perception prior to the crisis that mortgage assets in general were low
risk and the introduction of subprime mortgages can explain the use of guarantees
in securitization in the ABCP market.
In most cases, ABCP conduits disclose rough compositions of the underlying
pool of assets but never the asset-specific information of the portfolio to outside
investors. Some ABCP conduits treat their holdings as proprietary and deliberately
do not disclose. While the majority of assets backing ABCPs are mortgage assets and
MBS, the introduction of subprime mortgages and the many types within subprime
enlarged δ, making the quality of assets backing ABCPs more heterogeneous. On
top of that, the booming housing market and the credit expansion made the return
variability (H − L) of prime mortgage assets very small. These two developments
led to condition (2.22) being violated, resulting in a preference for securitization
with guarantees over tranching for good assets.
In practice, both securitization with guarantees and tranching exist in the
shadow banking system. However, prior to the crisis, very few assets were com-
pletely tranched, especially the so-called equity tranches. These risky tranches were
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commonly insured to obtain an investment grade in order to be sold. Among all out-
standing ABCPs, over 70% were covered by credit and liquidity guarantees (Acharya
et al., 2013). This simple extension of the static model explains why securitization
with guarantees was so prevalent prior to the crisis.
Two empirically testable implications are: (1) ABCPs covered by credit or
liquidity guarantees are backed by high-quality assets; (2) the percentage of assets
being securitized whole-piece should increase during periods of rapid growth of sub-
prime mortgage lending, as in the mid- to late 1990s. So far, there is no existing
empirical evidence on these two points. Due to data limitation, I cannot test these
two implications, but these results point to a direction for empirical exercises that
can assess the importance of this channel.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter develops a theory of securitization based on intermediaries mini-
mizing the moral hazard that insiders can misuse assets held on-balance sheet. This
theory provides an novel economic rationale for“securitization without risk transfer.”
In an environment with the moral hazard of insiders diverting assets, inter-
mediaries securitize to increase the distance between assets and insiders, e.g. man-
agers, and thus ameliorate the moral hazard. Although the risk-sharing structures
are equivalent under deposit funding and securitization with guarantees, intermedi-
aries’ incentive to renege on their promises, i.e. the magnitude of moral hazard, is
different under the two funding modes.
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Under deposit funding, intermediaries hold assets on-balance sheet, and the
moral hazard is greatest for low-risk assets that yield sizable returns in bad states.
By contrast, under securitization, the moral hazard is most severe for high-risk
assets that require large reserve holdings for guarantees. The moral-hazard-reducing
motive implies that banks securitize low-risk assets and hold high-risk assets on-
balance sheet.
This agency cost perspective and the existing theories are not mutually exclu-
sive, and all are likely to have played a role in the crisis. The agency cost perspective
is able to explain some securitization behaviors that other theories cannot. More
importantly, in the post-crisis era where regulatory loopholes have been, to a large
extent, closed down, the agency cost perspective may very much be a relevant theory
of securitization. The paper shows that, besides risk transfer and regulatory arbi-
trage, moral hazard also plays an important role in affecting securitization decisions.
The static framework presented in this chapter can be easily extended to a dynamic
apparatus that enables the study of both explicit and implicit guarantees, as well as
the role of government bailouts in securitization, as I show in the following chapters.
The discussion of tranching versus securitization with guarantees explains the
prevalence of securitization with guarantees prior to the crisis. When mortgage
assets are sufficiently heterogeneous (the introduction of subprime mortgages), and
the prime ones are perceived to be sufficiently safe (booming housing market and
low interest rate), securitization with guarantees dominates tranching.
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Chapter 3: Explicit Guarantees, Implicit Guarantees, and Govern-
ment Bailouts
3.1 Introduction
This chapter develops a dynamic model to study both explicit and implicit
guarantees, by embedding the static model of securitization with moral hazard in
an infinite-period setup. The dynamic model unveils an important linkage between
securitization and government bailouts.
As in the Folk Theorem of repeated games, the BHC can use its franchise
value as a commitment device to overcome the moral hazard of diverting assets and
default.1 But as the moral hazard gets stronger, the strength of franchise value as a
commitment device gets weaker. When risky assets are securitized, a large amount
of reserves are held on-balance sheet. As a result, the magnitude of the moral hazard
is high, and very few risky assets can overcome the moral hazard. Thus, the agency
cost mechanism identified in Chapter 2 carries over into the dynamic framework,
1“The original Folk Theorem concerned the payoffs of all the Nash equilibria of an infinitely
repeated game. This result was called the Folk Theorem because it was widely known among
game theorists in the 1950s, even though no one had published it. Friedman’s (1971) Theorem
concerns the payoffs of certain subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of an infinitely repeated game,
and so strengthens the original Folk Theorem by using a stronger equilibrium concept – subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium rather than Nash equilibrium. The earlier name has stuck, however:
Friedman’s Theorem (and later results) are sometimes called Folk Theorems, even though they
were not widely known among game theorists before they were published” (Gibbons, 1992, p. 89).
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and only low-risk assets are securitized.
A new mechanism, the franchise value mechanism, arises in the dynamic set-
ting. High-return assets generate high franchise values, thereby making it easier
for the bank entity to commit not to default under deposit funding. This makes
securitization less valuable as a method to reduce and/or overcome the moral haz-
ard. Thus, the franchise value mechanism promotes deposit funding for high-return
assets.
In an extension to the dynamic model, this chapter unveils a novel channel
through which the possibility of government bailouts exacerbate the moral hazard
and reduce total investment irrespective of the funding mode. This adverse effect
is stronger for riskier assets under deposit funding, implying that intermediaries
finance a larger portion of riskier assets off-balance sheet. Government bailouts thus
have the effect of promoting securitization of risky assets.
Specifically, when the BHC defaults, there is a chance that it will be bailed
out, where the probability of a bailout conditional on default is strictly less than one.
After a bailout, the BHC continues to operate, but it can no longer overcome moral
hazard via commitment and hence lives with a post-bailout profit that is lower than
the one before default. The probabilistic nature of bailouts induces a misalignment
of incentives: the risk-neutral BHC values the possibility of bailouts, but infinitely
risk-averse outside investors do not value it at all, as the probability of bailouts is
strictly less than one. The misalignment exacerbates the moral hazard, and thus
reduces total investment irrespective of the funding mode.2
2If the misalignment was not present, government bailouts would not exacerbate the moral
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This misalignment is larger for riskier assets if they are financed on-balance
sheet. Outside investors do not value bailouts, but the bank entity values them very
much. For riskier assets, the post-bailout profit under deposit funding is still high, as
the agency costs in this case is small. To reduce misalignment, the BHC optimally
securitizes these assets. When the probability of getting a bailout is sufficiently
high, the effect of government bailouts dominates the agency cost mechanism, and
the BHC finances a larger portion of risker assets via securitization.
This chapter also discusses the implications of different forms of guarantees.
Explicit guarantees are contracted insurance to outside investors, while implicit
guarantees are only verbal promises. With explicit guarantees, agency costs under
securitization increase in both the risk level and information intensity of the under-
lying asset. Therefore, intermediaries securitize assets with either low information
intensity or low risk. Implicit guarantees are non-contractual promises sustained by
bank reputation. Hence, intermediaries only securitize information-intensive assets
for which bank reputation is highly valued.
The dynamic model can explain several important empirical regularities about
the shadow banking system. The use of guarantees and the prioritization of secu-
ritizing safer assets induce an increase in reserve holdings that may dominate the
reduction of riskier assets on-balance sheet. This is consistent with the regularity
that banks sponsoring off-balance-sheet conduits tend to have high bank leverage
in comparison to non-sponsor banks (Altunbas et al., 2009; Kalemli-Ozcan et al.,
hazard. For example, when government bailouts occur with probability one conditional on default,
financial intermediaries and outside investors will collectively increase risk taking and shift the
risks to the public sector.
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2012; Kohler, 2015)(empirical fact I). When probabilistic government bailouts are
available, the misalignment between banks’ and investors’ perceptions of the value of
bailouts increases with the likelihood of a bailout, thereby explaining the extensive
participation and risk-taking of larger banks in shadow banking (Kalemli-Ozcan et
al., 2012; Acharya and Schnabl, 2010; Acharya et al., 2013) (empirical fact II). The
resulting increase in the securitization of risky assets is consistent with the empirical
finding that banks securitize risky assets but keep safe assets on their balance sheets
(Mian and Sufi, 2009; Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2011)(empirical fact III).
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the related
literature. Section 3.3 presents the benchmark dynamic model and studies securiti-
zation with explicit and implicit guarantees respectively. Finally, Section 3.4 extends
the benchmark dynamic model to study the role of government bailouts in inducing
risk-taking in securitization. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
The first contribution of this chapter is that it builds on the static framework
in Chapter 2 and develops a dynamic apparatus that can be easily extended in
different directions.
The dynamic framework is closest to the reputational model in Gorton and
Souleles (2007) that is used to understand implicit guarantees. They show that
banks provide implicit guarantees to overcome adverse selection, and these guar-
antees are sustained by bank reputation. While their study focuses on why banks
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provide guarantees to outside investors, this chapter emphasizes the implications of
honoring guarantees ex-post for the ex-ante securitization decision.
Ordonez (2014) also develops a reputational model and argues that the rep-
utational benefit of honoring implicit guarantees is lower under adverse economic
circumstances. By contrast, Segura (2013) emphasizes the signaling role of honor-
ing guarantees and shows that a pooling equilibrium, in which both good and bad
banks signal, is more likely to arise in bad states. These studies all abstract from
the questions of whether and which assets to securitize, which are the focal point of
this dissertation.
This chapter also contributes to the literature by differentiating explicit and
implicit guarantees and discussing the different effects of them on intermediaries’
securitization decisions. The chapter compares the set of assets that would be se-
curitized under the two forms of guarantees, and the very different securitization
decisions predicted by the model offer testable implications that can be explored
empirically.
Last but not least, the chapter unveils a novel perspective that the possibility
of government bailouts may worsen moral hazard and make financial intermediaries
worse off ex-ante. This adverse effect arises when bailouts are ex-ante probabilis-
tic and investors are more risk-averse than intermediaries. The exacerbated moral
hazard reduces investment regardless of the funding mode, but more severely when
riskier assets are financed on-balance sheet. Thus, when there is a high chance of
government bailouts in the event of default, securitization will be geared toward
riskier assets, increasing output volatility. To the best of my knowledge, this is the
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first paper that relates government bailouts to shadow banking and explores how
bailouts affect the choice of assets for securitization.
3.3 Securitization with Moral Hazard: Benchmark Dynamic Model
In the static model, the BHC cannot commit not to default unless it receives
incentive payments, and hence only the agency cost mechanism is at play. In a dy-
namic framework, the BHC may also use its franchise value to commit not to default,
giving rise to a franchise value mechanism, through which high-expected-return as-
sets are more likely to be held on-balance sheet, as opposed to being securitized in
the static model. The ability to overcome moral hazard depends on both the fran-
chise value and the magnitude of moral hazard. Hence, the agency cost mechanism
is still at play in the dynamic model.
3.3.1 Securitization with Explicit Guarantees
3.3.1.1 Model Setup
Everything is the same as in the static benchmark, except that now the econ-
omy has an infinite horizon, t = 0, 1, ...,∞. The three types of agents – a risk-neutral
BHC, a risk-neutral equity investor, and infinitely risk-averse outside investors – are
infinitely-lived with a common time preference β ∈ (0, 1). The BHC invests in the
risky asset at the beginning of each period, and returns are realized and consumed
at the end of each period.
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Bankruptcy In a dynamic setting, it is important to specify the consequence of
default. Default happens either when the bank entity fails to pay depositors in full,
or when the SPV fails to honor guarantees to ABS investors. After a default, the
BHC declares bankruptcy and loses its ability to raise external funding forever, i.e.
its franchise value. In this section, I assume that there are no government bailouts
after default.
3.3.1.2 BHC’s Optimization Problem
Similar to Acharya (2003), all profits generated by the BHC in a period are
consumed by the equity investor at the end of each period. As the equity investor
cannot commit to any dynamic investment strategy, the BHC’s problem can be
expressed as a stationary dynamic program as follows:
Vt = max
AB , AS , XB , XS , ρ, p, R
EΠD + EΠS + I{no default}βVt+1,
subject to L̃XB ≥ XB − AB, (3.1)
min{L+ ρ,H}/p ≥ 1,
AS + pXS ≥ XS +RXS,
R ≥ ρ̃, (3.2)
A ≥ AB + AS.
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The expected per-period returns EΠD and EΠS are given by
EΠD =
[





EΠS = [qR + (1− q)(R− ρ)]XS − AS,
where L̃ is the pledgeable return per unit of the risky asset under deposit funding.
βVt+1 is the discounted continuation value of the bank. I{no default} is an index
function that equals 1 when the BHC does not default, and 0 otherwise.
In the dynamic setting, rather than relying on incentive payments, the BHC
can use its franchise value to commit not to default. All the constraints are the
same as in the static model, except that in (3.1) the pledgeable return L̃ depends
on whether or not the bank entity can commit not to default, as discussed further
below. Similarly, in (3.2), the minimum required reserves per ABS, ρ̃, depend on
whether or not the SPV can commit not to default.
Deposit Funding Without incentive payments, the BHC potentially has incen-
tives to default in both states. In the absence of franchise value considerations, the
bank always has an incentive to default in the low state. However, if the following
condition holds:
H − L ≤ αH, (3.3)
the bank also has an incentive to default in the high state. Since αL < αH, the
sufficient ex-post incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) to ensure that the bank
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does not default in either state when H − L ≤ αH is
αHXFB ≤ βV FB, (ICCH)
where XFB = A
1−L is the first-best level of investment of a credible bank, and
V FB = 1
1−β · X
FB [E(x)− 1] is the first-best franchise value. Conversely, if (3.3)
does not hold, the bank would only default in the low state absent franchise value
considerations, and the sufficient ex-post ICC is
αLXFB ≤ βV FB. (ICCL)
ICCH and ICCL ensure that the bank entity’s commitment is credible. In
other words, even if the bank has an incentive to default absent franchise value
considerations, it will not do so, as losing franchise value is too much compared to




L if H − L ≤ αH and ICCH holds, or if H − L > αH and ICCL holds,
(1− α)L otherwise.
If the relevant ICC holds, rational investors know that the bank will not default
ex-post, and they will finance XB = X







FB. Note that ICCH and ICCL can be simplified to
αH ≤ β
1− β
· [E(x)− 1] , (3.4)
αL ≤ β
1− β
· [E(x)− 1] . (3.5)
Securitization Under securitization, the BHC only has an incentive to seize re-
serves and default in the low state, in the absence of franchise value considerations.
Therefore, the required reserves per ABS, ρ̃, are given by
ρ̃ =

ρ if αρXFB ≤ βV FB, (ICCS)
ρ/(1− α) if αρXFB > βV FB,
where ICCS is the incentive compatibility constraint under securitization that en-
sures that the SPV’s commitment is credible. In other words, if ICCS holds, the
cost of default (losing franchise value) is too high compared to the one-time gain
from seizing reserves.
If ICCS is satisfied, ABS investors will finance XS = X
FB. Otherwise, they






< XFB. ICCS can be simplified to
α(H − L) ≤ β
1− β
· [E(x)− 1] . (3.6)
As in the static model, I proceed, without loss of generality, by splitting the
BHC’s problem into two, one under each funding mode.
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3.3.1.3 Threshold α under Deposit Funding
Conditions (3.3), (3.4), and (3.5) generate three thresholds, αDH1 , α
H
1 , and α
L
1 ,
respectively. The superscript “DH” stands for “default in high state”, and “H” and
“L”stand for“high state”and“low state” respectively. The three thresholds together
generate a unique threshold information intensity, below which the bank entity can
achieve XFB.
Lemma 5. (Threshold information intensity under deposit funding) As-
























For α ∈ [0, α1], depositors agree to finance X = XFB = A1−L . Otherwise, depositors




1 is increasing in H and decreasing in L. α
H
1
is increasing in L and decreasing in H. αL1 is increasing in H and decreasing in L.
When α ≤ α1, the one-time gain of default is too small compared to the
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forfeited franchise value. Therefore, default is less tempting, and the bank entity’s
commitment is credible.
I conduct the same experiments as in the static model: (1) increasing risk
in a mean-preserving fashion, and (2) fixing the risk level and increasing the mean
return. To do this, I re-write the above thresholds in terms of the mean and standard





























For a given µ, αDH1 is increasing in σ: high-risk assets enlarge the non-default
payoff in the high state, H −L, making default in the high state less tempting. For
a given σ, αDH1 is decreasing in µ, since a higher µ means a higher high-state return,
making default in the high state more tempting. Threshold αL1 is increasing in σ,
since high-risk assets yield less in the low state and diminish the one-time gain of
default. On the contrary, αH1 is decreasing in σ, as high-risk assets yield more in
the high state, making default in the high state more tempting. Both αH1 and α
L
1
are increasing in µ, as higher franchise values strengthen incentives to repay and
maintain reputation – the franchise value mechanism.
Figure 3.1 depicts the threshold information intensity under deposit funding
for different levels of risk and a fixed mean return. The shaded region under the
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Figure 3.1: Threshold α under Deposit Funding
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thick solid line shows values of α and σ for which the bank entity can achieve the
first-best level of investment through credible commitment. The vertical width of
the shaded region is generally increasing in the level of risk, especially for medium-
to high-risk assets. This is because of the agency cost mechanism – under deposit
funding, high-risk assets yield less in the low state, reducing the benefit of default
and and making it easier for the bank entity to commit.
3.3.1.4 Threshold α under Securitization with Explicit Guarantees
Condition (3.6) defines a threshold information intensity α2, below which the
SPV can achieve XFB under securitization.
Lemma 6. (Threshold information intensity under securitization) As-








For α ∈ (0, α2], ABS investors agree to finance X = XFB = A1−L . Otherwise, ABS




. The threshold α2 is increasing in both
H and L.
When α is smaller than α2, the one-time gain of default is too small relative
to the cost of default. When securitizing assets with α ∈ (0, α2], the bank has no
incentive to default ex-post, and ex-ante investors will finance XFB. For assets with
α ∈ (α2, 1], the SPV cannot credibly commit not to default, and hence the level of
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it is obvious that α2 is increasing in µ and decreasing in σ. A higher mean return
gives the SPV more incentives to repay and maintain reputation, while a higher risk
implies larger reserve holdings that worsen the incentive to repay. This is again the
agency cost mechanism.
Figure 3.2 depicts the threshold information intensity under securitization for
a fixed mean return and different risk levels. The shaded region shows parame-
ter combinations for which the SPV can achieve the first-best level of investment
through credible commitment.
3.3.1.5 Range of Securitization with Explicit Guarantees
Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 describe the set of assets for which the first-best level
of investment can be achieved under deposit funding and securitization. Once α is
sufficiently high that the BHC cannot commit, we are back in the static model, as
far as comparing deposit funding versus securitization. Combining Corollary 1 and
Lemma 5 and 6, a full description of optimal funding modes is derived.
Proposition 3. (Optimal funding modes) Assume both deposit funding and
securitization with explicit guarantees are allowed, and αB = αS = α. For assets
with α ∈ [0,min {α1, α2}), the BHC is indifferent between deposit funding and se-
curitization, with the level of investment given by X = XFB = A
1−L . If α1 ≥ α2, the
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Figure 3.2: Threshold α under Securitization
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BHC strictly prefers deposit funding for assets with α ∈ [α2, α1], with X = XFB.
If α2 ≥ α1, the BHC strictly prefers to securitize assets with α ∈ [α1, α2], with
X = XFB. When α0 = 2− HL ≥ max {α1, α2}, the BHC strictly prefers to securitize
assets with α ∈ (max {α1, α2} , α0], with X = XSd = A1−L+αH−L
1−α
. For assets with
α ∈ (max {α1, α2, α0} , 1], the BHC strictly prefers on-balance sheet financing, with
X = XBd =
A
1−L+αL .
The left panel of Figure 3.3 is a map of optimal funding modes for assets with
the same µ and different σ. The optimal funding mode in each region is labeled
and shaded. The range of α for which securitization is strictly preferred is generally
decreasing in the level of risk (except the very left end with very small σ). Assets
with both high information-intensity and high risk are less likely to be securitized,
as they are too obscure to be accepted by outside investors, and the associated
reserves create agency costs that are too large under securitization. This reflects
the agency cost mechanism in the dynamic setting. Among the safest assets, banks
strictly prefer to securitize assets with high information intensity. As the agency
base under securitization is very small given the low risk, the bank can afford to
securitize information-intensive assets.
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Figure 3.3: Map of Optimal Funding Modes with Explicit Guarantees
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The right panel of Figure 3.3 depicts optimal funding modes for a fixed σ
and varying µ. For a wide range of α (0% to almost 50%), securitization strictly
dominates deposit funding for low-return assets, while the bank is indifferent between
the two funding modes for high-return assets. This is the effect of the franchise value
mechanism. High-return assets have high franchise values, and hence the associated
cost of default is large. In other words, high franchise values make default less
tempting, and thus make the bank entity’s commitment more credible. For high-
return assets, the increased ability to achieve the first-best level of investment under
deposit funding reduces the region where securitization is strictly preferred.
3.3.2 Securitization with Implicit Guarantees
In some markets, regulation forbids the use of explicit guarantees, and finan-
cial intermediaries resort to implicit guarantees.3 The difference between an explicit
and an implicit guarantee lies in the legal consequence of reneging on the guaran-
tee promise ex-post. Explicit guarantees are contractual, and failing to honor them
constitutes a default that forfeits the bank’s franchise value. Meanwhile, implicit
guarantees are non-contractual, and the bank is not legally obligated to repay any-
thing. I assume that if a bank“defaults”on its implicit guarantees, it loses credibility
in the ABS market and subsequently continues as a discredited bank that can use
3The existence of implicit guarantees is well documented in credit-card securitization (Higgins
and Mason, 2004; Gorton and Souleles, 2007). The maturities of ABS backed by credit card
debts are much longer than ABCPs, thus deeming liquidity guarantees invalid as a way to provide
guarantees without being treated as equivalent to on-balance sheet financing. However, sponsor
banks have the discretion to designate losses from credit card debts as due to fraud. The rules of
credit card securitizations require fraud losses to be absorbed by sponsors, while pure credit losses
fall on investors of ABS (Gorton and Metrick, 2012).
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only deposit funding subject to moral hazard.
3.3.2.1 Range of Securitization with Implicit Guarantees
In the previous section, since the bank can only seize a portion of the assets
held on-balance sheet in the event of default, I assumed αB = αS = α < 1. Under
implicit guarantees, the bank can potentially seize all of the reserves and still not be
held liable in court. Therefore, I assume αB < αS = 1 in this section. Recall that in
the static model, as αS → 1, the agency cost of securitization goes to infinity, making
securitization unsustainable. In the dynamic framework, implicit guarantees can be
supported by the BHC’s reputation. Once reputation is lost, the BHC becomes a
discredited bank entity in all future periods and is identical to the deposit funding
case of the static model.
With implicit guarantees, the ex-post incentive compatibility constraint under
securitization is given by
(H − L)XFB ≤ β
(
V FB − V Bd
)
,
where the left hand side is what the BHC gets from reneging in the low state – the
entire reserve holding. The right hand side is the cost of reneging – the discounted




1−L+αL [E(x)− 1] is
the franchise value of a discredited bank entity with XBd =
A
1−L+αL . The cost of not
honoring guarantees, β
(
V FB − V Bd
)
, is the discounted reduction in the franchise
value caused by losing credibility. A discredited bank entity suffers agency costs,
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and hence the cost of not honoring guarantees is large when agency costs are high
absent reputation. As a result, the BHC is less tempted to renege on guarantees if
assets are subject to high agency costs under deposit funding without reputation.
This condition gives rise to a minimum on-balance sheet information intensity for
securitization.
Proposition 4. (Region of securitization with implicit guarantees) When
both deposit funding and securitization with implicit guarantees are allowed, the
BHC strictly prefers deposit funding for assets with αB ∈ [0,min{α1, αIM}], with
investment given by X = XFB = A
1−L . If αIM < α1, the BHC is indifferent between
deposit funding and securitization for assets with αB ∈ (αIM , α1), with X = XFB. If
αIM ≥ α1, the BHC strictly prefers deposit funding for assets with αB ∈ (α1, αIM),
with X = XBd =
A
1−L+αL . For assets with αB ≥ max{α1, αIM}, the BHC strictly














and where ∂αIM/∂H ≥ 0 while ∂αIM/∂L ≤ 0.
The commitment device in securitization with implicit guarantees is the BHC’s
reputation, the value of which depends in part on whether agency costs are high with-
out reputation. Therefore, the BHC only securitizes highly information-intensive




, is the net
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benefit from honoring implicit guarantees if failing to do so constitutes a legal de-
fault. Note that if βV FB ≤ R, the SPV would default even when facing the strongest
penalty. This threshold is decreasing in βV FB −R, as a higher net benefit from re-
payment constitutes a stronger commitment device, and is increasing in R, as more
reserves provide stronger incentives to “default.”
The left panel of Figure 3.4 plots optimal funding modes with µ = 1.03 and
varying σ. The securitization region lies where information intensity under deposit
funding is relatively high and the risk level is relatively low. As assets get riskier,
the securitization region vanishes due to the increase in reserve holdings associated
with high-risk assets, making default more tempting – the agency cost mechanism.
The right panel of Figure 3.4 plots optimal funding modes with σ = 0.15 and
a range of µ. The securitization region lies where the mean return is relatively high,
as high mean returns increase the net benefit of honoring implicit guarantees – the
franchise value mechanism.
3.3.3 Explicit vs. Implicit Guarantees
In this section, I superimpose the plots from the previous two sections to
evaluate the optimal funding mode when deposit funding and securitization with
both kinds of guarantees are available.
The left panel of Figure 3.5 shows the optimal funding modes under securiti-
zation with implicit and explicit guarantees for a fixed µ. The right panel of Figure
3.5 does the same thing, but for a fixed σ. The region for securitization with implicit
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guarantees is a subset of that with explicit guarantees. Since implicit guarantees
provide the BHC a form of insurance, in the sense that the bank can continue to
operate following a“default,” the bank has greater incentive to renege on its promise.
Therefore, under implicit guarantees, rational investors are only willing to finance
the first-best level of investment for a more selected set of assets. This result can
be generalized as long as outside investors are more risk-averse than the BHC. The
plot suggests that medium-risk assets with medium information intensities should
only be securitized with explicit guarantees – a potentially testable implication for
empirical work.
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Figure 3.4: Map of Optimal Funding Modes with Implicit Guarantees
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Figure 3.5: Explicit versus Implicit Guarantees
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3.3.4 Securitization, Asset Ranking, and the BHC’s Portfolio
Introducing securitization changes the size and composition of the bank entity’s
portfolio. To see this, imagine that all the assets have the same information intensity,
α = 0.3, and the same mean return, µ = 1.03, but different levels of risk. Each asset
is in limited supply, and all the assets can be thought of as lying on the horizontal
blue line at α = 0.3 in Figure 3.6.
Before the introduction of securitization, the BHC invests according to the
left panel of Figure 3.6. In a static setting or a dynamic setting in which the BHC
cannot commit not to default, safer assets with higher pledgeable returns achieve
higher levels of investment, and hence are prioritized by the bank entity. In terms
of Figure 3.6, the bank entity has an incentive to invest from the left.
However, when the BHC can commit not to default using franchise value, the
bank may prioritize riskier assets to overcome moral hazard. Note that α1 is the
upper bound of α that the BHC can commit not to default in deposit funding. Since
α1 is upward sloping, there is a range of α (including α = 0.3 in the figure), in which
a safer asset may lie above α1, while a riskier asset lies below it. This implies that,
for some safer assets, the BHC cannot overcome moral hazard, while for some riskier
ones, the BHC can, due to the low returns in the bad state. This gives the BHC an
incentive to start investing from riskier assets.
To trade-off these two incentives, for each given level of α, the bank computes
a cutoff risk level σ̂(α) such that the asset with σ̂(α) generates the same profit as
the asset with σ0 = 0.06 (the lowest risk level in the left panel of Figure 3.6). For
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assets with σ > σ̂(α), even the first-best profit, A
1−L(σ) (µ− 1), is lower than the
profit from the safest asset, A
1−L(σ0)+αL(σ0) (µ− 1). It is easy to see that







For α = 0.3, under deposit funding, the bank entity starts investing from the
asset with σ = 0.132 (the first one in the shaded region in the left panel), and
moving right along the horizontal blue line (as indicated by the arrow on the right),
until it uses up all of its capital or reaches σ̂(0.3) = 0.197. If the bank entity still
has capital left after reaching σ̂(0.3), it goes to the asset with σ0 and moves right
again (as indicated by the arrow on the left).
After the introduction of securitization with explicit guarantees, the BHC in-
vests according to the right panel of Figure 3.6. In this map, with the help of secu-
ritization, safer assets can also achieve the first-best level of investment. Therefore,
the BHC starts by investing in very safe assets, prioritizing them for securitization
and de-prioritizing high-risk assets for deposit funding (as indicated by the long
arrow).
If the distribution of assets across σ has high densities for low values of σ, the
associated increase in reserve holdings on-balance sheet may dominate the reduction
in risky investments on-balance sheet, so that securitization may result in a higher
total leverage of a sponsoring bank entity (empirical fact I).
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Figure 3.6: Change in Asset Ranking
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3.3.5 Output Analysis
This section analyzes the output consequences of introducing securitization
with explicit guarantees to banks that otherwise rely only on deposit funding in the
dynamic model. This is carried out numerically using the results in the previous
two sections.
I discretize σ ∈ [0.06, 0.25] into 96 points, and assume that there is 1 unit of
asset available at each level of risk. All assets have a mean return of 1.03. The
probability of the high state is 0.8, and the discount factor is 0.9. The endowed
capital is A = 1. The information intensity α is varied across experiments.
Table 3.1 shows the mean and standard deviation of aggregate period-two
output before and after the introduction of securitization with explicit guarantees
in the dynamic model. At all levels of α, securitization weakly increases mean
output and reduces volatility. When both funding modes are available, the BHC
prioritizes securitizing low-risk assets and de-prioritizes deposit-funding high-risk
assets. As a result, the number of risky assets falls. The mean and volatility of
output after the introduction of securitization is constant across α, since, under the
given parameterization, the BHC always uses up its capital before going out of the
region where the first-best level of investment is achievable.
3.4 Securitization, Moral Hazard, and Government Bailouts
In the benchmark dynamic model, the penalty to the BHC for reneging on
its promises is losing external funding forever. In reality, banks have access to the
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Table 3.1: Output changes from securitization
α
Mean of output Vol. of output
before after change (%) before after change (%)
0.1 9.65 9.65 0 0.207 0.207 0
0.2 9.65 9.65 0 0.207 0.207 0
0.3 4.29 9.65 125% 0.271 0.207 -23.8%
0.4 3.08 9.65 213% 0.315 0.207 -34.3%
0.5 2.22 9.65 335% 0.351 0.207 -41.2%
public safety net – government bailouts that allow banks to continue operation after
default. In this section, I incorporate this realistic assumption into the dynamic
framework.
I define a bailout as help from the government to repay outside investors in
full, along with permission to continue operation after default rather than going out
of business. I assume that default of either the bank entity or the SPV triggers a
potential bailout with probability φ ∈ [0, 1).
In this section, I focus on deposit funding and securitization with explicit guar-
antees. This is because allowing for government bailouts only affects the equilibria
under deposit funding and securitization with explicit guarantees – these are the
cases where seizing assets constitutes a default. With implicit guarantees, the bank
is never legally obligated to repay, and thus failing to honor implicit guarantees does
not trigger a default.
After receiving a government bailout, the BHC continues to operate, but only
as a discredited bank entity or SPV, as in the static model, in all future periods.
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The cost of default is losing reputation and having to suffer agency costs thereafter.
The probabilistic nature of the bailout is crucial, as it induces misalignment between
outside investors’ and the BHC’s perceptions of the cost of default. The misalign-
ment exacerbates moral hazard and hence makes the BHC worse off irrespective of
the funding mode. Moreover, for riskier assets, the misalignment is larger under de-
posit funding: infinitely risk-averse outside investors value probabilistic bailouts at
0, while the bank entity values them highly as the bank entity can continue operating
with low agency costs. This misalignment reduces total investment irrespective of
the funding mode and works in the opposite direction of the agency cost mechanism,
promoting risk taking in securitization.
3.4.1 Threshold Information Intensity under Deposit Funding
With probability φ, the bank entity will be bailed out following a default and
continue as a discredited bank. Therefore, the incentive compatibility constraints
(ICCs) under deposit funding are now written as
αHXFB ≤ β
[





V FB − φV Bd
]
, (ICCL)









The cost of default is the expected reduction of franchise value caused by the res-
urrection of agency costs as a discredited bank, V FB − φV Bd . When agency costs
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are low, the franchise value of a discredited bank entity, V Bd , is high, making default
more tempting and commitments less credible. Recall that, without reputation,
riskier assets create lower agency costs under deposit funding, and hence they make
the bank entity worse off ex-ante by weakening its ability to commit.
Note that the above formulations of ICCH and ICCL critically hinge on the
assumption that the bailout probability is strictly smaller than 1. Specifically, the
continuation values, V FB and V Bd , are only finite and different from each other
when φ < 1. If φ = 1, outside investors know that their deposits are always safe
and will disregard the moral hazard of diverting assets. In this case, X = ∞ and
V FB = V Bd = ∞, and hence the above formulations would be invalid. The same
reasoning applies to the case of securitization as well.
As in the benchmark, conditions H − L < αH, ICCH, and ICCL together
create a maximum information intensity given by the following lemma.
Lemma 7. (Threshold information intensity under deposit funding) Un-
der deposit funding, there is a unique threshold level of information intensity
αB1 = min
{











































For α ∈ [0, αB1 ], investors agree to finance X = XFB = A1−L . Otherwise, investors
only finance X = XBd =
A
1−L+αL .
In the above equations, the terms multiplying (1− φ) represent the threshold
information intensity in the benchmark with a zero probability of bailouts. The
terms multiplying φ represent the threshold information intensity if the bailout
probability approaches 1. The first terms in the square brackets correspond to
the threshold levels of information intensity when the bailout probability is zero in
that , i.e. they are the same as the terms multiplying (1− φ). The identical second






, capture the effect of bailouts. When the
BHC receives a bailout, its cost of default is the re-emerged agency costs that are
associated with the low-state return of the asset. The lower the low-state return,
the lower the agency costs under deposit funding, and hence the lower the cost of
default, and thus the lower the threshold information intensity.
3.4.2 Threshold Information Intensity under Securitization
After being bailed out following a default, the SPV has two options: continuing
as a discredited SPV or as a discredited bank entity. Note that the first-best franchise
value, V FB, is always higher than the franchise value of a discredited SPV or a
discredited bank entity. The drop in the franchise value from losing reputation
constitutes the long-run cost of default and provides the credibility of commitment.
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Therefore, the ICC is given by:
α(H − L)XFB ≤ β
(
V FB − φmax{V Sd , V Bd }
)
(ICCS).
Again, the cost of default is the expected cost of losing reputation, V FB −
φmax{V Sd , V Bd }. When agency costs are high, the franchise value of a discredited
BHC, max{V Sd , V Bd }, is low, making default less tempting and commitments more
credible. Recall that, in the absence of reputation, riskier assets create higher agency
costs under securitization, and hence they make the BHC better off under securiti-
zation by strengthening its commitment.
This condition generates a threshold information intensity under securitization:
Lemma 8. (Threshold information intensity under securitization) Under






















H−L − (1− L)
L
.
For α ∈ [0, αB2 ], investors agree to finance X = XFB = A1−L in the SPV. Otherwise,






3.4.3 Range of Securitization
As in the benchmark, I combine Corollary 1 with Lemma 7 and Lemma 8 to
get the full range of securitization.
Proposition 5. (Region of securitization with government bailouts) As-
sume that both deposit funding and securitization with explicit guarantees are al-
lowed; that the BHC is bailed out by the government after a default with probability
φ ∈ [0, 1); and that αB = αS = α. The BHC is indifferent between deposit funding
and securitization for assets with α ∈ [0, αB1 ), with X = XFB = A1−L . If α
B
2 ≥ αB1 ,
the BHC strictly prefers securitizing assets with α ∈ [αB1 , αB2 ], with XFB = A1−L .





. For asses with α ∈ (max{αB2 , α0}, 1], the BHC strictly prefers
on-balance sheet financing with XBd =
A
1−L+αL .
Figure 3.7 plots the optimal funding modes when the probability of govern-
ment bailouts is set to φ = 0.99. In drastic contrast with the benchmark map, a
larger portion of riskier assets are now financed off-balance sheet. In the benchmark
dynamic model with no bailouts, the deposit funding threshold α1 is increasing in σ;
while with a high probability of a government bailout, the deposit funding threshold
αB1 is decreasing in σ.
The effect of a government bailout is twofold. First, bailout expectations
reduce the cost of default – instead of losing its entire franchise value, the BHC
only faces a reduction of its franchise value commensurate with the magnitude of
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the agency costs in the absence of reputation. This adverse effect uniformly limits
the set of assets for which a bank entity or an SPV can commit to repay, therefore
reducing total investment irrespective of the funding mode.
Second, in either funding mode, the BHC is less tempted to default when
facing a large drop in its franchise value after a default – the franchise value mech-
anism. Recall that the reduction of franchise value is commensurate with the res-
urrected agency costs after default. Also, without reputation, the BHC chooses
deposit funding for the most risky assets and chooses securitization for all the safer
ones. Therefore, for medium-risk assets, the post-default SPV continues as a discred-
ited SPV. Thus, from the agency cost mechanism, without reputation, medium-risk
assets inflict high agency costs under securitization but low agency costs under de-
posit funding. Therefore, when securitizing medium-risk assets, the SPV values its
reputation more than the bank entity does, making it easier to commit under secu-
ritization. The franchise value mechanism here increases the chance that banks will
fund riskier assets through securitization rather than deposit funding.
The pattern of the optimal funding modes is consistent with industry practice
and empirical regularities. In practice, small business loans are rarely securitized.
From the lens of this paper, they correspond to assets in the upper-right corner
in the left panel of Figure 3.7 and are not suitable for securitization due to their
high information intensities and high risks. Their risk levels are so high that even
securitization cannot help the BHC overcome moral hazard, and their information
intensities are so high that they can only be financed on-balance sheet.
Assets in the securitization region in the left panel of Figure 3.7 could represent
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sub-prime mortgages and other riskier assets that are not as high-risk and opaque as
small business loans. Given the high probability of government bailouts, these assets
create high misalignments if financed on-balance sheet and are optimally securitized.
Assets in the indifference region in the left panel of Figure 3.7 could represent
prime mortgages and other very safe and standardized assets. Prime mortgages are
more standardized than subprime mortgages and small business loans, and their risk
levels are in general very low.
In determining risk taking in securitization, the franchise value mechanism
works in the opposite direction of the agency cost mechanism, and the force of the
former is increasing in the likelihood of bailouts. This result implies that larger
banks that have higher access to government bailouts engage in securitization more
extensively, which is consistent with empirical fact II.
The outcome that, with a high probability of government bailouts, the BHC
finances a larger share of riskier assets via securitization is driven by the negative
slope of most parts of the deposit funding threshold αB1 . The downward sloping part
of αB1 is α
L
1 , as defined in Lemma 7. Therefore, to study the effect of government
bailouts, I look at the slope of αL1 with respect to σ. Corollary 3 decomposes the
slope of αL1 into two parts and derives the threshold level of the bailout probability
above which risk taking occurs in the shadow banking system.
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Figure 3.7: Map of Optimal Funding Modes with Probabilistic Government Bailouts
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Corollary 3. (Threshold bailout probability) When φ ∈ [0, 1), the partial




























(+) agency cost mechanism
.
Therefore, αL1 is decreasing in σ when φ >
β
1−β (µ− 1), i.e. when the franchise value
mechanism dominates the agency cost mechanism.
In the benchmark model with no bailouts (φ = 0), αL1 is increasing in σ.
When φ is sufficiently high, the franchise value mechanism dominates the agency
cost mechanism, and αL1 becomes decreasing in σ. A declining α
L
1 in σ implies that
banks are more likely to securitize riskier assets.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom that government bailouts induce risk
shifting from the banking sector to the public sector, this model unveils a novel
mechanism. The existence of bailouts weakens banks’ ability to overcome agency
problems. The probabilistic nature of the bailout plays a key role in inducing mis-
alignment between the BHC’s and outside investors’ perceptions of the cost of default
in traditional banking. As discussed earlier, if the probability of receiving govern-
ment bailouts equals to 1, the level of investment and the franchise value would be
infinity in either funding mode, and the formulations of all the incentive compatibil-
ity constraints would be invalid. In this case, risk-averse outside investors and the
BHC would collectively invest to infinity and shift the risk to the public safety net.
When the probability of receiving government bailouts is strictly less than one,
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the risk-neutral bank values the expected bailout, but investors do not value it at
all (since they are infinitely risk-averse). Because of this misalignment, government
bailouts exacerbate the moral hazard, and thus reduce total investment irrespective
of the funding mode. Moreover, for riskier assets, this misalignment is larger under
deposit funding. Infinitely risk-averse outside investors value probabilistic bailouts
at 0, while the bank entity values it very much as the bank entity can continue
operating with low agency costs. This effect encourages intermediaries to finance
a larger portion of riskier assets via shadow banking. If the misalignment is not
present, government bailouts would not exacerbate the moral hazard, as both outside
investors and the BHC value the bailout equally.
The conventional view on government bailouts predicts excessive risk-taking
by bank entities. However, prior to the recent financial crisis, risky assets were
concentrated in the shadow banking sector (empirical fact III), consistent with the
prediction of this novel channel.
Figure 3.8 illustrates how the region of securitization changes with φ, the
probability of getting a government bailout conditional on a default. The dark gray
region is where the BHC is indifferent between deposit funding and securitization.
The light gray region is where securitization is strictly preferred. The white region
is where deposit funding is strictly preferred. As the probability of getting a govern-
ment bailout increases, the lower bound of the region where securitization is strictly
preferred becomes downward sloping.
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Figure 3.8: Map of Optimal Funding Modes and the Probability of Bailouts
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3.4.4 Output Analysis
This section conducts the same output analysis as in Section 3.3.5, but as-
suming a bailout probability φ = 0.99 after a default. Table 3.2 shows the mean
and standard deviation of period-two output before and after the introduction of
securitization.
Securitization still increases expected output, as investment is boosted by over-
coming agency costs. However, the increase in expected output comes with an in-
crease in volatility. On the one hand, the increase in investment itself increases
volatility, since all assets are risky. More importantly, the reduction of agency costs
increases the capital utilization efficiency defined as the maximum level of invest-
ment per unit of capital, thus allowing the BHC to invest in riskier assets down the
rank that otherwise wouldn’t be exploited.
Table 3.2: Output changes from securitization w/ bailout
α
Mean of output Vol. of output
before after change (%) before after change (%)
0.1 9.65 9.65 0 0.207 0.207 0
0.2 3.73 9.65 159% 0.115 0.207 79.7%
0.3 2.82 9.65 242% 0.098 0.207 110%
0.4 2.26 9.65 327% 0.087 0.207 137%
0.5 1.89 9.65 411% 0.079 0.207 161%
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3.4.5 Policy Implications
There is empirical evidence that underscores the marked variation in the per-
formance of different classes of securitized assets during and after the financial crisis
(Segoviano et al., 2013). This model points to the role of government bailouts in af-
fecting risk preferences under securitization. Systemically important intermediaries
have a higher chance of receiving government bailouts than small intermediaries.
The variation in the possibility of bailouts may contribute to the variation in the
performance of securitized assets across different origination intermediaries. This
outcome is consistent with empirical facts. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2012), Acharya
and Schnabl (2010), and Acharya et al. (2013) show that, before the financial crisis,
larger banks securitized riskier assets.
The positive contribution of the paper is to point out that, besides risk transfer
and regulatory arbitrage, there is also moral hazard involved in securitization, and
the moral hazard has important implications for bank behavior. Moreover, the paper
provides a new understanding of how government bailouts affect shadow banking.
These new perspectives should be considered by regulators to ensure sound policy
making.
The model completely abstracts from regulatory arbitrage, yet it can still
generate the result that, when securitization becomes available, banks finance more
risky assets off-balance sheet, as long as there is a possibility of a government bailout.
Therefore, the model suggests that, even if regulatory arbitrage can be cleaned up,
banks may still securitize risky assets, especially too-big-to-fail banks. In the model,
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risk taking in securitization is an efficient equilibrium outcome that is inherently
neither good nor bad per se, but the stability of the system critically hinges on
the sufficiency of reserves held on-balance sheet to honor guarantees. From the
perspective of the delegation theory of regulation, regulators should monitor on
behalf of investors to ensure that banks hold adequate reserves for the guarantees
they provide.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter embeds the static model of securitization with moral hazard in
an infinite-period setup and develops a dynamic apparatus to study both explicit
and implicit guarantees.
In a dynamic setting, the BHC can use their franchise value as a commitment
device to overcome the moral hazard of diverting assets and default. But as the
moral hazard gets stronger, the strength of franchise value of a commitment device
gets weaker. When risky assets are securitized, a large amount of reserves are held
on-balance sheet. As a result, the magnitude of the moral hazard is high, and very
few risky assets can overcome the moral hazard. Thus, the agency cost mechanism
identified in Chapter 2 carries over into the dynamic framework, and only low-risk
assets are securitized.
A new mechanism, the franchise value mechanism, arises in the dynamic set-
ting. High-return assets generate high franchise values, thereby making it easier
for the bank entity to commit not to default under deposit funding. This makes
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securitization less valuable as a method to reduce and/or overcome the moral haz-
ard. Thus, the franchise value mechanism promotes deposit funding for high-return
assets.
Introducing probabilistic government bailouts unveils a novel channel through
which bailout expectations exacerbate the moral hazard and reduce total investment
by creating misalignment of incentives between outside investors and banks. This
misalignment is larger for riskier assets if they are financed on-balance sheet. To
reduce misalignment, banks securitize riskier assets and hold safer ones on-balance
sheet. Government bailouts thus have the effect of inducing banks to securitize risky
assets. The linkage between government bailouts and securitization decisions is a
novel result of the dissertation.
This chapter discusses the implications of different forms of guarantees. With
explicit guarantees, banks securitize assets with either low information intensity or
low risk. By contrast, with implicit guarantees, banks only securitize assets with
high information intensity and low risk. The very different securitization decisions
under the two types of guarantees predicted by the model offer testable implications
that can be explored empirically.
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Chapter 4: Securitization and Monitoring
4.1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, a lot of academic and regulatory
concerns circle around the consensus that higher securitization activity is associated
with a reduction in loan quality.
Regarding the connection between securitization and loan quality, the empiri-
cal literature has shown two major regularities. First, the credit expansion before the
crisis, and in particular to subprime borrowers, was closely related to the increase
in securitization (Berndt and Gupta, 2009; Mian and Sufi, 2009; Pernanandam,
2011; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2012; Elul, 2015). This is consistent with the results in
Chapter 3, where large banks that have access to government bailouts expand lever-
age through securitization, and the majority of the securitized assets are relatively
high-risk assets.
The second, and more interesting, empirical finding is that securitization may
lead to diminished bank monitoring (Berndt and Gupta, 2009; and Keys et al.,
2010). In particular, Keys et al. (2010) exploit an industry rule of thumb, i.e. a
cutoff credit score of 620, and find that delinquency rates of securitized mortgages
are higher than those of similar loans kept on-balance sheet. Ex-ante, borrowers
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with credit scores of 621 and 620 were very similar, but mortgages with score 621
were much easier to be sold and hence were more frequently securitized. They show
that the average delinquency rate jumps up at this ad-hoc rule of thumb cutoff
score. This result suggests that securitization adversely affects the screening and/or
monitoring incentives of financial intermediaries.
This chapter discusses the linkage between securitization and ex-post moni-
toring and attempts to explain the latter regularity. To focus on how the choice
of funding modes affects ex-post monitoring decisions, I compare monitoring in-
centives when different funding modes are employed exogenously. I argue that the
moral hazard of diverting assets, i.e. the benchmark moral hazard, naturally gives
rise to a lower incentive to screen borrowers and monitor assets after fund raising via
securitization. In other words, under securitization, the benchmark moral hazard
induces a new moral hazard of weak monitoring. Intuitively, while securitization
reduces the moral hazard of managers diverting assets, it at the same time increases
the distance between managers and the assets. This enlarged distance inevitably
reduces managers’ incentives to exert effort after fund raising.
As in earlier chapters, this paper studies the optimal contract between ratio-
nal outside investors and financial intermediaries. The new element added to the
benchmark model is ex-post monitoring. Ex-post monitoring increases the expected
return of risky assets, but is costly. One can interpret ex-post monitoring as any
costly effort that is exerted after an intermediary has raised its funds. For example,
after fund raising, banks screen borrowers to decide who to lend out. Knowing that
loans originated down the road will be securitized, banks may act sloppy in the
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screening process. Another example is due diligence. When loans are to be secu-
ritized, banks may have less incentive to perform due diligence, e.g. call borrowers
when they are late for payments.
The key sequence of moves is that outside investors provide funds to inter-
mediaries first, and then intermediaries decide whether or not to exert effort. This
ordering creates a time-inconsistency problem that is at its core a moral hazard
problem in which intermediaries’ monitoring effort is not contractible. Rational in-
vestors observe an intermediary’s monitoring cost and comprehend the consequence
of its potential default and thus form beliefs about its ex-post monitoring effort.
Funding is provided ex-ante according to these beliefs. In a rational expectation
equilibrium, outside investors’ ex-ante beliefs are consistent with the intermediary’s
ex-post monitoring action.
In an environment with moral hazard of diverting assets, the BHC’s equi-
librium payoffs are determined by what can be diverted off-equilibrium. Under
securitization, assets are moved to off-balance sheet vehicles, and only reserves are
held on-balance sheet. Thus, the BHC’s payoff is determined solely by the amount
of reserves set aside ex-ante. The incentive to monitor depends on the contingency
of the BHC’s payoff on the monitoring action, and since neither the amount nor
the return of reserves depend on ex-post monitoring, the BHC has less incentive to
monitor securitized assets.
This chapter also studies monitoring incentives under different guarantee struc-
tures. Under securitization, the incentive to monitor is the weakest when guarantees
are implicit, as these guarantees allow banks to renege on their monitoring promises
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without being declared bankrupt and punished.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 summarizes the
related literature. Section 4.3 describes the setup of the model with monitoring.
Section 4.4 studies a static model with monitoring, and Section 4.5 extends it to a
dynamic framework. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
This chapter is related to several strands of literature. First of all, it is related
to the empirical literature that points to the dual role of securitization in exacerbat-
ing adverse selection and worsening moral hazard (Berndt and Gupta, 2009; Mian
and Sufi, 2009; Pernanandam, 2011; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2012; Elul, 2015). This
line of literature argues that securitization and the resulting liquid market for loans
induce banks to originate and sell lower quality assets based on private information
(adverse selection), and/or that this liquid market diminishes bank monitoring that
affects loan quality ex-post (moral hazard). This chapter builds on the novel agency
cost perspective of this dissertation to explain the moral hazard of weak screening
and monitoring after fund raising.
On the theoretical side, this chapter is closely related to the literature studying
endogenous information acquisition and security design. There is a long literature
that studies the optimal security design to provide incentives to sell good loans
(Innes, 1990; Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995; Hartman-Glaser et al., 2013) and to pro-
vide market liquidity (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Nachman and Noe, 1994; DeMarzo
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and Duffie, 1999; Biais and Mariotti, 2005; DeMarzo, 2005; Plantin, 2009). Par-
lour and Plantin (2008), Malherbe (2012), and Vanasco (2014) study the trade-off
between incentives to issue good quality assets and to provide market liquidity.
Parlour and Plantin (2008) studies the impact of an active loan market on
banks’ monitoring efforts from an adverse selection perspective. In their model, the
ability to benefit from inside trading reduces banks’ incentives to monitor loans.
In particular, banks monitor less to refrain from inside trading, which ameliorates
potential adverse selection and improves market liquidity. In contrast to their work,
this chapter studies the impact of an active market on banks from a moral hazard
perspective. In my setting, weak monitoring is not driven by the motive of reduc-
ing adverse selection when selling old loans, but by the combination of the use of
guarantees and the benchmark moral hazard of diverting assets.
This chapter abstracts from optimal security design for liquidity provision
and focuses on the optimal contract between investors and intermediaries to induce
the intermediary to put ex-post effort in an investment project that is consistent
with investors’ expectations. In this sense, this chapter is closely related to Innes
(1990) who finds that the optimal security design in this context is debt. I compare
monitoring incentives under different debt structures, i.e. debt structured with
explicit and implicit guarantees. Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) studies incentive-
compatible loan sales that allow for implicit guarantees. They show that, if loans are
not fully guaranteed implicitly, banks do not undertake the level of credit evaluation
or monitoring that they would were they to hold the entire loan. By contrast, this
chapter shows that, in the presence of the moral hazard of insiders diverting assets,
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even full guarantees (either explicit or implicit) cannot assure the level of monitoring
that would be implemented if assets were held on-balance sheet. To the best of my
knowledge, this is the first paper that explicitly models and differentiates types of
guarantees and studies their implications for monitoring incentives.
Fender and Mitchell (2009) study how retention mechanisms affect the incen-
tives of originators to screen and monitor loans. They find that retention of the
first-loss tranche cannot fully correct monitoring incentives when systematic risk
factors dominate idiosyncratic factors in determining asset returns. My model de-
livers a similar result that providing guarantees cannot fully correct incentives, not
because of systematic risk factors but because of the moral hazard of diverting assets.
The linkage between the benchmark moral hazard and the induced moral hazard of
weak monitoring is a novel result of this chapter.
This chapter is also related to the growing literature studying information
acquisition and market competition in banking. Hauswald and Marquez (2006) argue
that banks acquire information about clients to fend off competitors. However, Ahn
and Breton (2014) argue that, in an environment where banks profit from poaching
competitors’ clients, banks securitize and strategically reduce monitoring to soften
competition and increase profits from poaching. In contrast to their setting, banks




Monitoring increases the expected return of risky assets, but is costly. Specif-
ically, the BHC can monitor the asset after origination at a cost of C per unit of
investment. The cost of monitoring, C, is publicly observable, but the monitoring
action is unobservable and non-verifiable. If the BHC monitors, the low-state re-
turn is L̄, otherwise it is L < L̄. The high-state return is unaffected by monitoring.
Without loss of generality, I assume that the BHC only defaults in the low state. In
order to affect the level of investment, monitoring must change the low-state return,
as outside investors are infinitely risk-averse.
Let µ̄ denote the mean return of a monitored asset, and µ the mean return
of an unmonitored asset. I assume that the expected net unit profit from the risky
asset is positive when the BHC monitors, i.e. C < µ̄ − 1, and when the BHC does
not monitor, i.e. µ > 1.
The timeline of the actions is the following. First, a funding mode is exoge-
nously given. Then, both outside investors and the BHC observe C. After observ-
ing C, investors present two compensation schemes for the BHC to pick. Investors
observe the BHC’s choice and form an ex-ante belief about the BHC’s ex-post mon-
itoring action. Funds are provided according to their beliefs. After the asset is
originated, the BHC decides whether or not to monitor the project. Finally, returns
are realized, and the BHC chooses between defaulting or not. As in the benchmark,
in the event of default, the BHC seizes a portion α of assets held on-balance sheet.
The sequence of events is summarized in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Sequence of Events
Investors observe 
and offer compensation 
schemes
The BHC observes 












Definition of Equilibrium The equilibrium is defined as in Section 2.3.2 with
an additional condition that in equilibrium the ex-ante belief must be consistent with
the ex-post monitoring action.
Given this notion of equilibrium, there are three possible outcomes: (1) a
monitoring equilibrium, where investors ex-ante expect the BHC to monitor, and
it indeed monitors; (2) a no-monitoring equilibrium, where investors ex-ante expect
the BHC to shirk, and it indeed shirks; and (3) no equilibrium, where investors’
ex-ante belief is not consistent with the BHC’s ex-post action.
The analysis first derives for each given funding mode the maximum monitor-
ing cost that can sustain a monitoring equilibrium, and then compares the thresholds
under different funding modes. When the threshold under a certain funding mode
is higher, the economy is more likely to arrive at a monitoring equilibrium under
that funding mode, and therefore that funding mode induces a stronger monitoring
incentive.
In the static benchmark model, I show how agency costs interact with mon-
itoring decisions. Next, I introduce monitoring into the dynamic model and show
that securitization reduces monitoring incentives.
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4.4 Static Benchmark
I first characterize the condition on the monitoring cost under which the econ-
omy would arrive at a monitoring equilibrium for the case of deposit funding, and
then repeat the analysis for securitization. To serve as a benchmark, if monitoring
was contractible, the BHC would monitor if the total expected profit from monitor-
ing is no less than the total expected profit from not monitoring, i.e.








This condition yields the first-best cutoff level of the monitoring cost that is given
by:
ĈFBB = (µ̄− 1)−
(
µ− 1
) 1− L̄+ αL̄
1− L+ αL
.
The right-hand-side captures the total benefit of monitoring: the increase in the
unit expected profit and the increase in leverage.
Since monitoring is not verifiable, any compensation scheme designed to induce
monitoring must alter payments contingent on the low-state return. The realization
of the low-state return conveys precise information on the BHC’s monitoring action,
i.e. if it turns out to be L̄, the BHC must have been monitoring, and otherwise
it must not have been monitoring. The high-state return conveys no information
regarding the BHC’s action. Therefore, the efficient compensation scheme to induce
monitoring must satisfy the following conditions: (1) depositors get a non-contingent
137
return if the BHC indeed monitors (given depositors’ infinite risk-aversion), and (2)
conditional on the level of investment determined ex-ante, the BHC’s expected payoff
from monitoring is not lower than its payoff from shirking.




H − L̄+ αL̄+ λ if H is realized,
αL̄+ λ if L̄ is realized,
αL otherwise,
where ω is the BHC’s payoff, and the superscript m stands for monitoring. λ is a
non-negative scalar (to be determined) capturing the compensation for the BHC’s
cost of monitoring. The payoff when L is realized is the total value that the BHC
can seize in a default.
In the no-monitoring equilibrium, investors do not need to compensate the
bank for the monitoring cost, and the compensation scheme is simply
ωnm =

H − L+ αL if H is realized,
αL otherwise.
where the superscript nm stands for no-monitoring.
With a sufficiently low C and the optimal λ, the monitoring scheme is sufficient
to induce ex-post monitoring. Therefore, if the bank chooses the optimal monitoring
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scheme, investors know for sure that the bank will indeed monitor. Otherwise,
investors believe that the bank will shirk.
I use backward induction to first derive the optimal λ and then the thresh-
old C. Conditional on choosing the monitoring scheme and having originated the
project, the optimal λ ensures that the bank would indeed monitor, by making the
equilibrium expected profit equal to the off-equilibrium expected profit from shirk-
ing. The optimal λ is characterized in the following lemma. See Appendix A for
derivation.










Lemma 9 states that when C ≤ α(1− q)(L̄−L), the optimal λ = 0, i.e. when
monitoring is sufficiently low cost relative to its positive effect on the expected re-
turn, the bank monitors voluntarily. When C > α(1−q)(L̄−L), extra compensation
that materializes only in the high state and when the low state return is good is
needed to induce the bank to monitor.
Since C is observable, outside investors offer the optimal λ for a given C
and let the bank choose one compensation scheme. The bank chooses the moni-
toring scheme if the expected profit is greater than the expected profit from the
no-monitoring scheme. To eliminate uncertainty about the bank’s choice, I assume
that when expected profits from the two schemes are equal, the bank chooses the
monitoring scheme. The comparison of the profits from the two schemes yields a
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threshold C below which the bank chooses the monitoring scheme. See Appendix A
for derivation.
Lemma 10. (Threshold monitoring cost when only deposit funding is
available) When only deposit funding is available, the economy arrives at a moni-
toring equilibrium if the monitoring cost is smaller than
ĈD = (1− q)(L̄− L).
The economy follows the no-monitoring equilibrium when the monitoring cost is
larger than ĈD.
One can check that ĈD < ĈFBB . Because monitoring is non-contractible, in-
vestors must compensate the bank for monitoring, which reduces the bank’s leverage
and hence the benefit of monitoring.
Now I repeat the analysis for the case of securitization. Again, to serve as
a benchmark, the first-best cutoff level of the monitoring cost if monitoring was






) 1− L̄+ α(H − L̄)/(1− α)
1− L+ α(H − L)/(1− α)
.
Note that under securitization, the assets on-balance sheet are the reserves. In
a monitoring equilibrium, the amount of reserves is H−L̄
1−α . In the high state, the bank
keeps all the reserves. In the low state with L̄, the bank keeps α of them plus extra
compensation λ for monitoring. However, if the bank shirks and L is realized, the
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bank has insufficient reserves and defaults on its guarantees. In this case, the BHC
seizes α of the reserves set aside ex-ante. Therefore, the monitoring and shirking




1−α + λ if H is realized,
αH−L̄







1−α if H is realized,
αH−L
1−α otherwise.
Using the monitoring compensation scheme, given the pre-determined level of
investment and that the SPV chooses the monitoring scheme, the expected profit of
an SPV that indeed monitors ex-post is
πmeq = [q (R + λ) + (1− q) (αR + λ)− C]XS − A,
whereas that of an SPV that shirks ex-post is
πmoffeq = [q (R + λ) + (1− q)αR]XS − A.
To induce the SPV to indeed monitor after choosing a monitoring scheme, the
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following condition must hold
πmeq ≥ πmoffeq.





It is easy to see that the λ under securitization is strictly larger than the λ
under deposit funding. This is because that the low-state payoff net of λ under
securitization is only a function of the quantity of reserves, R, which is not affected
by the monitoring action. Therefore, in order to induce the SPV to monitor, a higher
incentive payment is needed. This intuition will be carried over into the dynamic
framework.
Following the same comparison between the profits from the two schemes, one
can easily derive the threshold monitoring cost under securitization. See Appendix
A for derivation.
Lemma 11. (Threshold monitoring cost when only securitization is avail-
able) When only securitization funding is available, the economy arrives at a mon-
itoring equilibrium if the monitoring cost is smaller than
ĈS =
(µ̄− 1)(1− L+ αH−L
1−α )− (µ− 1)(1− L̄+ α
H−L̄
1−α )
(µ− 1)/(1− q) + 1− L+ αH−L
1−α
.
The economy follows the no-monitoring equilibrium when the monitoring cost is
larger than ĈS.
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One can check that ĈS < ĈFBS . To determine the BHC’s incentive to monitor,
I compare the threshold monitoring costs under the two funding modes in Lemma
10 and Lemma 11. See Appendix A for the derivation of the following proposition.
Proposition 6. (Monitoring incentives in a static model) The threshold
monitoring cost under securitization is higher than that under deposit funding, i.e.
ĈS > ĈD.
If we regard C as a stochastic variable whose value is revealed publicly at the
beginning of period 1, for any distribution of C, the probability of a monitoring
equilibrium is higher under securitization than under deposit funding. This result
critically hinges on the assumption that monitoring only increases the low-state
return of the risky asset. The monitoring action affects the profit of the BHC via
two channels: (1) the incentive payment, λ, and (2) the low-state return.
As discussed earlier, monitoring does not affect the return of the safe reserves,
and thus the incentive payment under securitization is higher than that under de-
posit funding. The high incentive payment under securitization reduces the level of
investment and the potential benefit of monitoring, thereby reducing the monitor-
ing incentive. From this channel, monitoring affects the level of investment via the
incentive payment, and securitization weakens monitoring incentive.
In the second channel, monitoring increases the low-state return, which boosts
both the level of investment and the unit profit under either funding mode. More-
over, the increased low-state return due to monitoring also affects the agency costs.
In particular, a higher low-state return elevates the agency costs under deposit fund-
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ing but lowers those under securitization. Therefore, the benefit of monitoring is
greater under securitization. From this channel, monitoring affects both the level of
investment and the unit profit, and securitization strengthens monitoring incentive.
In the static framework, the second channel dominates the first one, and secu-
ritization induces stronger monitoring. In a dynamic framework, I will focus on the
set of assets that the BHC can successfully use its franchise value to overcome the
agency costs. As a result, the above second channel will vanish and the first channel
will dominate.
4.5 Dynamic Framework
In the dynamic framework, the BHC can use its franchise value to commit to
monitor, rather than relying on the incentive payment, λ. I derive the threshold
level of the monitoring cost below which the BHC can credibly commit to monitor
ex-post. Contrary to the result in the static model, securitization induces weak
monitoring.
I will focus on the set of assets that the BHC can successfully use its franchise
value to overcome agency costs. Therefore, the first-best cutoff level of the mon-
itoring cost in the absence of both agency costs and moral hazard in monitoring,
irrespective of the funding mode, is given by:






In the dynamic setting, the BHC’s payoff in the event of default is crucial for
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its incentives to monitor. Under deposit funding, if the bank shirks and the risky
asset doesn’t yield enough return to fully repay depositors, the bank will default.
Conditional on the level of investment determined ex-ante, in a default, the bank
seizes αL per unit of investment. Meanwhile, if the bank monitors, its low state
payoff is αL̄. Therefore, the monitoring action affects the BHC’s ex-post payoff in
the low state.
On the contrary, under securitization, if the bank shirks, the reserves will not
be sufficient to fully honor the guarantees. In a default, the bank seizes αR per unit
of investment. Note that the size of reserves R is determined ex-ante, and hence
the BHC’s ex-post payoff in the low state is not affected by the monitoring action.
Therefore, in the dynamic setting, the bank has less incentive to monitor securitized
assets. This result is consistent with the empirical findings by Berndt and Gupta
(2009) and Keys et al. (2010).
Moreover, implicit guarantees further weaken the incentive to monitor. Intu-
itively, with implicit guarantees, failing to honor guarantee payments doesn’t trigger
a legal default, which makes shirking more tempting. Therefore, the use of implicit
guarantees further weakens monitoring incentives.
4.5.1 Monitoring in Deposit Funding
I first derive the threshold monitoring cost under deposit funding. Conditional
on the ex-ante belief that the bank entity will monitor ex-post, if the bank entity
indeed monitors, its low-state return is αL̄. However, if the bank entity shirks after
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having promised to monitor, the risky asset yields a rate of return L, and the bank
entity would fail to repay depositors in full, which constitutes a default. In the event
of default, the bank entity seizes αL. Therefore, the bank entity’s ex-post low-state
return depends on its monitoring action.
The one-time unit gain from shirking is the monitoring cost minus the return
difference, i.e. C − α(1 − q)(L̄ − L). After a default, the bank loses its franchise
value. Therefore, the incentive compatibility constraints under deposit funding are
as follows:




· µ̄− 1− C
1− L̄
if α < ᾱB, (4.1)











· µ̄− 1− C
L̄
.
When α < ᾱB, the level of investment is A
1−L̄ . Otherwise, investment is
A
1−L̄+αL̄ .














The economy arrives at a monitoring equilibrium only when the monitoring cost is







4.5.2 Monitoring in Securitization with Explicit Guarantees
Now I turn to characterize the threshold monitoring cost in securitization with
explicit guarantees. Under securitization, the amount of reserves R is determined
ex-ante by outside investors’ beliefs. If the BHC monitors as promised, it gets αR
in the low state. If the BHC shirks after having promised to monitor, it will not
have enough reserves to fully honor guarantees, and hence would default in the low
state. In the event of default, the BHC seizes αR. Therefore, the BHC’s ex-post
low-state payoff is independent of the monitoring action, and the one-time unit gain
from shirking is simply C.
This observation is crucial for the result. The moral hazard of misusing assets
held on-balance sheet naturally gives rise to the moral hazard in ex-post monitoring.
In an environment with moral hazard, the BHC’s equilibrium payoff is determined
by how much the BHC can divert off-equilibrium, which is a fixed fraction of the
reserves set aside ex-ante. Therefore, the BHC’s ex-post payoff in the bad state is
not contingent on the performance of the securitized assets, precisely because of the
moral hazard of misusing assets.
Intuitively, the BHC securitizes assets to reduce the moral hazard of insiders
diverting assets by increasing the distance between the managers and the assets.
The increased distance weakens managers’ incentives to perform due diligence.
The incentive compatibility constraints under securitization with explicit guar-
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· µ̄− 1− C
1− L̄















· µ̄− 1− C
H − L̄
When α < ᾱS, the level of investment is A




. Conditions (4.3) and (4.4) lead to a unique threshold monitoring














The economy arrives at a monitoring equilibrium only when the monitoring





. It is easy to see that ĈSex,mh is strictly
smaller than ĈDmh. As a result, the economy is less likely to arrive at a monitoring
equilibrium, if the BHC uses securitization with explicit guarantees.
4.5.3 Monitoring in Securitization with Implicit Guarantees
Finally, I derive the threshold monitoring cost under securitization with im-
plicit guarantees. Since guarantees are implicit, the BHC is not legally obligated
to honor them ex-post. However, since securitization with implicit guarantees is
completely supported by bank reputation, if the bank shirks after having promised
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to monitor, it loses its reputation and can no longer securitize with implicit guaran-
tees. Similar to the intuition in Section 3.3.2, given that the SPV can fail to honor
its monitoring promise without being held liable in court, once the SPV loses its
reputation, no outside investors would lend to the SPV. Thus, the BHC can only
continue as a discredited bank entity after a “default” on its monitoring promise.
Specifically, conditional on the ex-ante belief that the BHC will monitor ex-
post, if the BHC shirks, with probability 1 − q, the low state realizes, and it runs
short of reserves to pay outside investors in full as they expected. In this case, the
BHC “defaults” on its monitoring promise and loses the reputation that it needs to
sustain securitization with implicit guarantees. Moreover, as the BHC is losing its
reputation anyway because of shirking, it might as well just seize all the reserves,
and it would still not be held liable in court. Therefore, the total one-time gain from
shirking under securitization with implicit guarantees is
C
1− L̄
+ (1− q) H − L̄
1− L̄
.
The long-run cost is losing reputation and having to operate as a discredited bank
entity that suffers agency costs.
Since I focus on the set of assets that the BHC can securitize with implicit
guarantees in the first place, I restrict the following analysis in the region where











Conditional on a monitoring belief, securitization with implicit guarantees can be
sustained only when α > αIM . The derivation of this threshold simply follows the
analysis in Section 3.3.2.





The corresponding incentive compatibility constraint to ensure that the BHC would
indeed monitor ex-post is
C
1− L̄





 µ̄− 1− C1− L̄ − µ̄− 1− C1− L̄+ αL̄︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
 . (4.5)





Similar to the previous case, the corresponding incentive compatibility constraint is
C
1− L̄





 µ̄− 1− C1− L̄ − µ− 11− L+ αL︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
 . (4.6)
The second term on the left had side is strictly positive in both (4.5) and (4.6).
Moreover, the second term in the square bracket is also strictly positive in both (4.5)
and (4.6). Therefore, the threshold monitoring cost with implicit guarantees, in
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either case, ĈSim,mh, is smaller than that under securitization with explicit guarantees,




mh. The economy arrives at a monitoring equilibrium only






The relevant thresholds of the monitoring cost are summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 7. (Monitoring incentives in a dynamic model) Under deposit














































where ĈSim,mh is the solution to the following equation, if C ≤ ĈD:
ĈSim,mh
1− L̄













or the solution to the following equation otherwise:
ĈSim,mh
1− L̄


















mh, and hence Ĉ
S
im ≤ ĈSex ≤ ĈD.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter studies how securitization affects financial intermediaries’ screen-
ing and monitoring incentives. I argue that securitization induces weak screening
and monitoring due to the increased distance between managers and assets.
The combination of the use of guarantees and the benchmark moral hazard
diminishes bank monitoring under securitization. This result is consistent with the
recent empirical findings of high delinquency rates of securitized mortgages. The
linkage between the benchmark moral hazard and the induced moral hazard of weak
monitoring is a novel result of the dissertation.
In an environment with the moral hazard of diverting assets, banks’ payoffs
are determined by what can be diverted off-equilibrium. Under securitization, assets
are moved to off-balance sheet vehicles, and only reserves are held on-balance sheet.
Thus, banks’ payoffs are determined solely by the amount of reserves set aside ex-
ante. Incentives to monitor depend on the contingency of banks’ payoffs on the
monitoring action, and since neither the amount nor the return of reserves depend
on ex-post monitoring, banks have less incentives to monitor securitized assets.
This chapter studies monitoring incentives under different guarantee struc-
tures. Among all guarantee types, the incentive to monitor is the weakest when
guarantees are implicit, as these guarantees allow banks to renege on their monitor-
ing promises without being declared bankrupt and punished.
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Appendix A: Math Appendix
Corollary 1









which yields the threshold
α < α0 = 2−H/L.
The monotonicity follows from above equation.
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Corollary 2
Proof. Let µ and σ denote the expectation and the standard deviation of the bino-
mial distribution. It is easy to get










The expression for α0 follows.
Lemma 4
Proof. From Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, the minimum signaling costs for a bad bank
under securitization with guarantees and under tranching satisfy the following equa-
tions respectively:
A [µ− 1− (1− q)δ]
1− L+ δ + α





(µ− 1)− CWb , (A.1)





(µ− 1)− CTb . (A.2)
Let Φ = A [µ− 1− (1− q)δ] and Ψ = A (µ− 1). Multiplying both sides





, and both sides of equation (A.2) by
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(1− L), one can get:
1− L+ α
1−α(H − L)
1− L+ δ + α
1−α(H − L+ δ)









Φ = Ψ− CTb [µ− L] . (A.4)
First I prove that, when α > 0, the ratio on the left-hand side (LHS) of
equation (A.3) is strictly larger than the ratio on the LHS of equation (A.4).
One can rewrite the two ratios on the LHS of (A.3) and (A.4) as:
1− L+ α
1−α(H − L)
1− L+ δ + α



















1− L+ δ + α(H − 1)
. (A.7)
Dividing both the numerator and the denominator of the RHS of (A.7) by












Using (A.5) and (A.6), the following inequality holds:
1− L+ α
1−α(H − L)
1− L+ δ + α





Therefore, the ratio on the left-hand side (LHS) of equation (A.3) is strictly larger
than the ratio on the LHS of equation (A.4).
Moreover, since α > 0,
µ− L+ α
1− α
(H − L) > µ− L.


























Therefore, if α ∈
(
(0, αDH1 ) ∩ (0, αL1 )
)
∪ (αDH1 , 1) ∩ (0, αH1 ), the bank can credibly
commit. Since αL1 > α
H




max{αDH1 , αH1 }, αL1
}
.
The monotonicity follows from above equations.
Lemma 6








The monotonicity follows from above equation.
Proposition 4
Proof. With implicit guarantees, the ex-post incentive compatibility constraint is
given by
(H − L)XFB ≤ β
(


















This condition can be written as












which is equivalent to
β
1− β
[E(x)− 1] · A
1− L




[E(x)− 1] · A
1− L+ αL
.
The LHS can be written as
β
1− β
















If αL ≥ ϕS, the ex-post incentive compatibility constraint holds and the BHC
can commit. Therefore, the threshold αIM is given by αIM = ϕS/L.
The monotonicity, ∂αIM
∂H
≥ 0 and ∂αIM
∂L
≤ 0, follow from the above equations.
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Lemma 7




























































(0, αDH1 ) ∩ (0, αL1 )
)
∪ (αDH1 , 1) ∩ (0, αH1 ), the bank entity can commit. Since
αL1 > α
H
1 , the threshold information intensity is given by
αB1 = min
{





Proof. ICCS can be written as
α(H − L)XFB ≤ φβ
(
V FB −max{V Sd , V Bd }
)
+ (1− φ)βV FB
Hence, the threshold αB2 is a linear combination of the thresholds from the following
two conditions:
α(H − L)XFB ≤ βV FB,
α(H − L)XFB ≤ β
(
V FB −max{V Sd , V Bd }
)
.


























H−L − (1− L)
L
.
The threshold αB2 is given by
αB2 = φα
con2













Proof. ∵ αL1 = φ
[
β


































































Proof. After the asset is originated, the level of investment is fixed from the BHC’s
perspective. Using the monitoring compensation scheme, the expected return of a

























To induce the bank entity to indeed monitor after choosing the monitoring
scheme, the following condition must hold
πmeq ≥ πmoffeq.











Proof. Conditional on investors’ belief in a monitoring equilibrium, investors’ payoff
per unit of investment is (1− α)L̄− λ. Hence, the level of investment is given by
XB =
A
1− L̄+ αL̄+ λ
.
The expected return of a bank who chooses the monitoring scheme and indeed
monitors is given by
πmeq =
A
1− L̄+ αL+ C
1−q
[µ̄− 1− C] .









The bank would choose the monitoring scheme, if πmeq ≥ πseq. Therefore, in a
monitoring equilibrium, the following must hold
A
1− L̄+ αL+ C
1−q






which is equivalent to
C ≤ ĈD1 =
(µ̄− 1)(1− L+ αL)− (µ− 1)(1− L̄+ αL)
(µ− 1)/(1− q) + 1− L+ αL
= (1− q)(L̄− L).
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Using the shirking scheme, the expected return of a bank that chooses the
shirking scheme and indeed shirks is
πseq = [q (H − L+ αL) + (1− q)αL]XB − A,
whereas that of a bank who chooses the shirking scheme but monitors is
πsoffeq =
[







To ensure that the bank indeed shirks in the shirking equilibrium, the shirk-
ing equilibrium payoff must be no less than the off-equilibrium payoff. Hence, the
following condition must hold
πseq ≥ πsoffeq,
which is equivalent to





As a result, the minimum level of monitoring cost in a shirking equilibrium is
ĈD2 = (1− q)(L̄− L) = ĈD1
Therefore, for any monitoring cost below ĈD ≡ ĈD2 = ĈD1 , the economy will
arrive at a monitoring equilibrium.
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Lemma 11
Proof. After the asset is originated, the level of investment XS and the reserves
R = H−L̄
1−α are fixed from the BHC’s perspective. Using the monitoring compensation
scheme, the expected return of an SPV who chooses the monitoring scheme and
indeed monitors is
πmeq = [q (R + λ) + (1− q) (αR + λ)− C]XS − A,
whereas that of an SPV who chooses the monitoring scheme but shirks is
πmoffeq = [q (R + λ) + (1− q)αR]XS − A.
To induce the SPV to indeed monitor after choosing a monitoring scheme, the
following condition must hold
πmeq ≥ πmoffeq.





Conditional on investors’ belief in a monitoring equilibrium, the BHC sets
aside safe reserves in the amount of R = H−L̄
1−α per unit of investment. Hence, the
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The expected return of an SPV who chooses the monitoring scheme and indeed







[µ̄− 1− C] .










The bank would choose the monitoring scheme, if πmeq ≥ πseq. Therefore, in a moni-













which is equivalent to
C ≤ ĈS1 =
(µ̄− 1)(1− L+ αH−L
1−α )− (µ− 1)(1− L̄+ α
H−L̄
1−α )
(µ− 1)/(1− q) + 1− L+ αH−L
1−α
> (1− q)(L̄− L).
Using the shirking scheme, the expected return of a bank that chooses the
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The bank would indeed shirk in the shirking equilibrium if πseq ≥ πsoffeq. Hence,






− (H − L̄)
)
− C.
Therefore, the minimum level of monitoring cost in a shirking equilibrium is
ĈS2 = (1− q)(L̄− L).
Since ĈS1 > Ĉ
S
2 , for any monitoring cost below Ĉ
S ≡ ĈS1 , the economy will arrive at
a monitoring equilibrium.
Proposition 6
Proof. Since ĈS2 = (1− q)(L̄− L) and ĈS1 > ĈS2 , ĈS > ĈD = (1− q)(L̄− L).
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Appendix B: Proportional Signaling Cost
B.1 Setup
As in the benchmark fixed signaling cost setup, the BHC has access to one
asset, and the quality of the asset is revealed only to the BHC before it meets with
outside investors. Again, a good asset yields H > 1 in the high state and L < 1 in
the low state, while a “lemon” yields the same in the high state but L− δ in the low
state.
After observing the quality of the asset, the BHC observes the cost to signal.
The cost of signaling is observable to both the BHC and outside investors. Per unit
of investment, sending a positive signal incurs a cost Cg if the asset is a good one, or
Cb if the asset is a lemon. After observing the asset quality and the signaling cost,
the BHC decides whether or not to send a positive signal and announces a security
structure.
Under the proportional signaling cost assumption, it is tricky in defining the
timing of signaling and fund raising. In the benchmark fixed cost setting, it is very
clear that the BHC signals first using its own capital and then attracts external
funding. When the cost of signaling is proportional to the level of investment, the
sequence of the move can be confusing. To clarify the timing, I assume that the
168
BHC has access to a credit source, similar to working capital financing, so that it
can draw credit from it to finance the proportional signaling cost. The BHC signals
while attracting funds from outside investors, and pays back the signaling credit
using its profits ex-post.
After observing the signal and the security structure, investors form beliefs
about the quality of the asset and provide funds to the BHC accordingly.
I assume that it is more costly to signal if the BHC is a bad bank. Formally,
this assumption is given by:
Cg < Cb,
where the subscript “g” stands for good and “b” stands for bad.
As in the benchmark, under each security structure, two types of equilibria
may arise in this signaling setting: a pooling equilibrium where both types either
always signals or do not signals; and a separating equilibrium where only the good
type signals.
The BHC would never signal in a pooling equilibrium, since signaling is costly.
Therefore, when a certain security structure is superior in terms of inducing a sepa-
rating equilibrium, it is equivalent to conclude that the security structure encourages
information-equalizing investment.
Following the routine in the benchmark setting, I solve the BHC’s optimal
choice of security structure backwards. I first characterize the minimum signaling
cost for a bad bank and the maximum signaling cost for a good bank that together
can induce a separating equilibrium, under each security structure. Since I assume
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that signaling has become sufficiently costless for everyone, I focus on the compar-
ison between the minimum signaling costs for a bad bank under the two security
structures.
Then I show that the same result arises under the proportional signaling cost
assumption, i.e. the minimum signaling cost for a bad bank is lower under securitiza-
tion with guarantees. Again, this suggests that whole-piece securitization increases
signaling efficiency and helps overcoming adverse selection.
Once this is proved, the rest of the results in the benchmark model follow.
B.2 Signaling under Securitization with Guarantees
This section characterizes the sufficient set of conditions on the signaling cost
under which a separating equilibrium arises under securitization with guarantees.
For a separating equilibrium to exist, two incentive compatibility constraints
must be satisfied – one that ensures that a bad bank would not signal, and one that
ensures that a good bank would signal. In other words, it must be (i) sufficiently
cheap for a good bank to signal and (ii) sufficiently expensive for a bad bank not to
signal. I start by characterizing the threshold signaling cost that satisfies incentive
compatibility (i).
Conditional on a separating belief, when a good bank signals, investors believe
that the low state return of the asset is L, and the agency cost per unit of asset is
then α








where the superscript “g” stands for a good bank, and the subscript “eq” indicates
that the BHC stays on the equilibrium path. It immediately follows that the equi-





(µ− 1− C) .
Now consider the case where a good bank deviates from the equilibrium path
and does not signal. In this case, investors do not observe the signal and believe
that the low state return of the asset is L− δ, and the agency cost per unit of asset
is then α
1−α(H − L+ δ). Conditional on this belief, the level of investment that the
BHC can achieve is
Xgoffeq =
A
1− L+ δ + α
1−α(H − L+ δ)
.




1− L+ δ + α
1−α(H − L+ δ)
(µ− 1) .
To induce a good bank to stay on the equilibrium path and signal, the equi-




This condition gives rise to the maximum signaling cost for a good bank under
whole-piece securitization with guarantees:








Intuitively, for a good bank, the cost of signaling must be smaller than the








and each unit of investment in the good asset yields a net profit of (µ− 1).
Now I turn to characterize the threshold signaling cost that satisfies incentive
compatibility constraint (ii): it is sufficiently expensive to signal so that a bad bank
would not signal.
Conditional on a separating belief, if a bad bank does not signal, investors
believe that the low-state return is L − δ, and the agency cost per unit of asset is
α
1−α(H − L + δ). It is easy to see that the expected profit on the equilibrium path
under securitization with guarantees is given by:
πbeq =
A
1− L+ δ + α
1−α(H − L+ δ)
[µ− 1− (1− q)δ] .



























(µ− 1− C) .
The incentive compatibility constraint to ensure that a bad bank does not
signal is πbeq ≥ πboffeq, which yields the minimum signaling cost for a lemon needed
to sustain a separating equilibrium as:




1−α(H − L) +
δ
1−α
[µ− 1− (1− q)δ] , (B.2)
Intuitively, the cost of signaling must be high enough to outweigh the benefit
of signaling for a bad bank not to signal. In a separating equilibrium, signaling
increases not only the level of investment, but also the unit profit. This is because
the BHC can always default in the low state and seize a fraction of the reserves.
Therefore, the BHC’s payoff in the low state from the investment is always equal to
that of a good bank.





Collecting Condition (B.1) and (B.2), I summarize the above results in the
following lemma:
Lemma 12. Under securitization with guarantees (whole-piece securitization), the
necessary and sufficient condition for a separating equilibrium to exist is:
Cg ≤ C̄Wg and Cb ≥ CWb ,
where C̄Wg and C
W
b are given by (B.1) and (B.2) respectively.
B.3 Signaling under Tranching





(µ− 1− C) .
In the case where a good bank deviates from the equilibrium path and does




[q(H − L+ δ) + (1− q)δ]− A,






In a separating equilibrium, the incentive constraint πgeq ≥ π
g
offeq must hold,
from which the maximum signaling cost for a good bank to sustain a separating
equilibrium is:








[µ− 1− (1− q)δ] .
Following the same logic in the benchmark, the off-equilibrium expected profit




[q(H − L) + (1− q)0− C]− A,




(µ− 1− C) .
In a separating equilibrium, the incentive constraint πbeq ≥ πboffeq must hold,
from which the minimum signaling cost for a bad bank to sustain a separating
equilibrium is:
Cb ≥ CTb = (µ− 1)−
1− L
1− L+ δ
[µ− 1− (1− q)δ] . (B.4)
The two thresholds for the cost of signaling under tranching are summarized
in the following lemma:
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Lemma 13. Under tranching, the necessary and sufficient condition for a separating
equilibrium to exist is:
Cg ≤ C̄Tg and Cb ≥ CTb ,
where C̄Tg and C
T
b are the solutions to equation (B.3) and (B.4) respectively.
Again, it is easy to check that CTb > C̄
T
g . The minimum signaling cost for a bad
bank must be higher than that for a good bank to support a separating equilibrium.
B.4 Threshold Signaling Cost
After having characterize the range of signaling costs that can sustain a sep-
arating equilibrium under each security structure, I now compare the minimum
signaling cost for a bad bank to sustain a separating equilibrium.
Using Lemma 12 and Lemma 13, we have the following lemma. See Appendix
A for the proof.
Lemma 14. When there is moral hazard, i.e. α ∈ (0, 1), the minimum signaling




Proof. From (B.2) and (B.4), the only difference between CWb and C
T
b is the giant
176





1− L+ δ + α(H − 1)
. (B.5)
Dividing both the numerator and the denominator of the RHS of (B.5) by














1− L+ δ + α
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